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Article 
DUE PROCESS ABROAD 
Nathan S. Chapman 
ABSTRACT—Defining the scope of the Constitution’s application outside 
U.S. territory is more important than ever. In February, the Supreme Court 
heard oral argument about whether the Constitution applies when a U.S. 
officer shoots a Mexican teenager across the border. At the same time, 
federal courts across the country scrambled to evaluate the constitutionality 
of an Executive Order that, among other things, deprived immigrants of 
their right to reenter the United States. Yet the extraterritorial reach of the 
Due Process Clause—the broadest constitutional limit on the government’s 
authority to deprive persons of “life, liberty, or property”—remains 
obscure. 
Up to now, scholars have uniformly concluded that the founding 
generation did not understand due process to apply abroad, at least not to 
aliens. This Article challenges that consensus. Based on the historical 
background, constitutional structure, and the early practice of federal law 
enforcement on the high seas, this Article argues that the founding 
generation understood due process to apply to any exercise of federal law 
enforcement, criminal or civil, against any person anywhere in the world. 
Outside the context of war, no one believed that a federal officer could 
deprive a suspect of life, liberty, or property without due process of law—
even if the capture occurred abroad or the suspect was a noncitizen. 
This history supports generally extending due process to federal 
criminal and civil law enforcement, regardless of the suspect’s location or 
citizenship. This principle has immediate implications for cross-border 
shootings, officially sponsored kidnappings and detentions abroad, the 
suspension of immigration benefits, and the acquisition of foreign evidence 
for criminal defendants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most perplexing questions in contemporary constitutional 
law is the extent to which the Bill of Rights applies outside the United 
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States.1 The doctrine is quite literally all over the map. Aliens outside the 
United States appear to have few constitutional rights,2 except, 
“paradoxically,” those held as enemies at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.3 
Scholars presume that citizens enjoy the same rights abroad that they have 
at home,4 but the only Supreme Court decision that is squarely on point 
suggests that due process rights for civilian citizens abroad depend on 
context.5 The Court rarely decides cases about whether constitutional rights 
apply abroad,6 and when it does, its decisions are often highly fractured.7 
The resulting doctrine is piecemeal, ad hoc, and unprincipled. 
Recent events have highlighted this doctrinal mess. Last term, the 
Supreme Court dodged a case that presented the question of whether the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments apply when a U.S. agent standing on U.S. 
soil shoots and kills a Mexican national on the other side of the border.8 
Meanwhile, President Donald Trump has issued a series of executive orders 
prohibiting “foreign nationals” of specific countries from immigrating to 
 
 1 See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?, at v (2009) 
(“[B]ecause this principle of territoriality is so commonplace, it is rarely examined and surprisingly ill 
defended.”). 
 2 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“It is well established that certain 
constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside 
of our geographic borders.”). See generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 
(1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search of an alien’s residence abroad); 
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not apply 
to enemy soldiers captured and detained abroad). 
 3  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769 (2008). See generally Mary Van Houten, The Post-
Boumediene Paradox, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9 (2014) (discussing the “paradox” of extending the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to enemy aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba without 
extending the protections of the Due Process Clause to nonenemy aliens abroad). 
 4 See RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 25 (“Today it is well accepted that the Bill of Rights protects 
U.S. citizens against their government wherever those citizens might be found.”). 
 5 See Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 6 Throughout this Article I use the term abroad to mean “outside U.S. territory.” The term is tidier, 
though admittedly more ambiguous, than extraterritorially. See P.G. Wodehouse, The Amazing Hat 
Mystery, in THE BEST OF WODEHOUSE 393 (2007) (“‘It’s the Spirit of something,’ said Nelson. ‘I don’t 
know what, quite, but of something. You see it on all sides. Something very serious has gone wrong 
with girls nowadays. There is lawlessness and license abroad.’ ‘And here in England, too.’ ‘Well, 
naturally, you silly ass,’ said Nelson, with some asperity. ‘When I said abroad, I didn’t mean abroad, I 
meant abroad.’”). 
 7 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261 (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the Court); id. at 275 
(Kennedy, J., joining the Court’s opinion but offering a much more functional rationale); id. at 279 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the result but not the rationale); Reid, 351 U.S. at 3 (Black, J., plurality 
opinion); id. at 41 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); id. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
result).  
 8 Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam), vacating and remanding Hernández v. 
United States, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that Mesa was entitled to qualified 
immunity on the Fifth Amendment claim and that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the 
shooting). 
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the United States.9 Each of the orders has raised questions about the 
applicability of the Bill of Rights to aliens abroad.10 The government, lower 
courts, and those affected by the government’s extraterritorial exercise of 
power would all benefit from a clearer formula for determining when the 
Bill of Rights applies abroad. 
With respect to the Due Process Clause especially, the current 
doctrinal map is difficult to justify by reference to the constitutional text. 
The Clause provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”11 As scholars have noted, the 
Clause seems to speak universally, without reference to location or 
citizenship.12 
Yet scholars seem to uniformly agree that early American history 
supports the notion that due process stopped—especially for aliens—at the 
nation’s borders.13 Professor Gerald Neuman summarizes the consensus: 
“The authors of the Bill of Rights almost certainly viewed everyone’s 
constitutional rights as territorially restricted by the national boundaries; 
that view is utterly discredited today, and the question whether nonresident 
aliens’ rights should continue to be so restricted cannot be answered by 
direct recourse to eighteenth-century practice.”14 The consensus is 
unsurprising. As Professor Andrew Kent has noted, “Globalists have not 
 
 9 The current Order is a Presidential Proclamation dated September 24, 2017. The Proclamation 
appears to update and in some respects to supersede Executive Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 
(Mar. 6, 2017), which replaced Executive Order 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
 10 See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017), 
vacating and remanding 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (upholding a nationwide injunction against the 
March 6, 2017 Order on the ground that it likely violated the Establishment Clause); Washington v. 
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding a nationwide injunction against the January 27, 2017 
Executive Order on the ground that it likely violated the Due Process Clause). 
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 12 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience, 27 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 11, 32 (1985); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 
8 (2003); Jules Lobel, The Constitution Abroad, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 871, 875–76 (1989). 
 13 See GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1996) (“Strict territoriality 
prevailed as dogma for most of American constitutional history.”); RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 38; 
Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1904 (2009) (“[T]he law generally 
had no coercive force (and thus a court had no jurisdiction or process) outside sovereign territory.”); J. 
Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 518–21 
(2007) (presenting evidence that due process did not apply to aliens abroad); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose 
Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 916–27 (1991) (canvassing a variety of views based on background 
law of nations principles); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the 
Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 234 (2010) (“Prevailing nineteenth-century law 
principles established that a nation’s legal jurisdiction to regulate conduct was coterminous with its 
territory.”). 
 14 NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 912. 
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presented any Founding era evidence that ‘due process’ was thought to 
protect aliens abroad.”15 
This Article challenges the scholarly consensus. It argues that the 
Constitution’s historical background and text and early American practice 
all strongly support the conclusion that the founding generation understood 
the Due Process Clause to apply to U.S. law enforcement against anyone, 
anywhere. This history challenges the Court’s gerrymandering of due 
process on the basis of geography and citizenship. 
The evidence falls into three broad categories. First, the British 
constitutional norm was that offenses at sea were tried according to due 
process. An Act of Henry VIII provided that special courts of Admiralty 
Sessions, composed of common law and admiralty judges, would try 
crimes committed within the admiralty jurisdiction by the “course of the 
common law . . . in like form and condition as if such offences had been 
done upon the land.”16 To make it easier to suppress piracy in the colonies, 
however, Parliament provided that vice-admiralty courts could try piracy in 
the colonies according to the civil law.17 American colonists generally 
objected to the trial of crimes by vice-admiralty courts because they 
believed Americans were entitled to the customary rights of Englishmen, 
especially trial by jury, the sine qua non of traditional due process.18 In 
short, British law and American beliefs about that law suggest that 
Americans would have found the act of Henry VIII—requiring the trial of 
offenses at sea according to the common law—to be constitutionally 
required. 
Second, the Constitution’s text suggests no territorial or citizenship 
limits on due process. As Professor Michael McConnell and I have argued, 
through the Antebellum Era, Americans understood due process to 
encapsulate a principle going back to Magna Carta that the government 
may deprive persons of “life, liberty, or property” only according to law.19 
To comply with due process, the federal government could deprive 
someone of rights only in compliance with the Constitution, statutes, 
treaties, court procedures, and general law, including the common law and 
the law of nations. The government had no authority to punish someone for 
 
 15 Kent, supra note 13, at 521 (emphasis added). 
 16 28 Hen. 8 c. 15 (1536); see also 27 Hen. 8 c. 4 (1536). See generally 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *71 (noting that pirates were entitled to “the common law of the land”). 
 17 An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 1700, 11 Will. 3 c. 7 (1698), reprinted in 
3 BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE: HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION, 1600–1730, at 59 (Baer ed., 
2007). 
 18 See infra Section II.C. 
 19 See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 
121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012). 
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a crime before a federal jury trial conviction or to enforce a forfeiture of 
property without a federal court judgment according to lawful procedures. 
Nothing in the constitutional text suggests that due process protected only 
citizens or applied only to deprivations of rights within U.S. territory.20 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, early practice uniformly 
comported with the plain meaning of the constitutional text. All of the 
evidence from early practice suggests that Americans believed the Due 
Process Clause extended to all law enforcement, even to law enforcement 
against aliens abroad. So far, scholars examining the Constitution’s 
extraterritoriality have largely ignored U.S. law enforcement on the high 
seas, but it occupied more federal resources than any other sort of law 
enforcement in the nation’s first generation.21 The federal statutes that 
defined piracy, the slave trade, and violations of U.S. neutrality stipulated 
that a defendant could be punished—criminally and civilly—only upon 
judgment in a federal court.22 Federal officers who captured suspects on the 
high seas, in foreign territorial waters, and even on foreign soil transported 
them back to the United States, where those suspects received the same due 
process protections as any other federal defendant.23 No one ever suggested 
that the rules could be different for suspects captured outside the United 
States, whether they were citizens or aliens. Criminal and civil law 
enforcement on the high seas overlapped in interesting ways, but for both, 
the federal government made a final deprivation of rights only after 
judgment in a federal court according to procedures stipulated by law—
common law procedures and jury trial in criminal cases and admiralty 
procedures in civil condemnation suits.24 
Americans never debated whether the Due Process Clause applied 
abroad. But the jurists and statesmen—such as Justice Iredell, William 
Wirt, Albert Gallatin, and John Quincy Adams—who considered the 
question concluded that the Fifth Amendment applied to all U.S. law 
enforcement.25 Executive practice was consistent with this. Although U.S. 
officers sometimes used force against suspects who resisted arrest, there is 
no evidence that U.S. officers believed they could punish suspects captured 
on the high seas without ordinary federal court procedures.26 Indeed, federal 
 
 20 See infra Part III. 
 21 See DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS AND CRIMINALS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801–1829, at 215 (1985) (admiralty and maritime crimes accounted for over 
30% of indictments from 1801 to 1829). 
 22 See infra Part IV. 
 23 See infra Part IV. 
 24 See infra Section IV.B. 
 25 See infra Sections V.A–B. 
 26 See infra Section V.B. 
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courts would have held an officer who did so personally liable in a 
damages action for marine trespass.27 Americans maintained this absolute, 
extraterritorial requirement of due process in spite of the fact that, as 
Britain had already discovered, common law protections made it difficult to 
suppress piracy (and the slave trade). Enforcing due process was costly, 
which suggests that Americans felt themselves obligated to do so. 
Why has this evidence eluded legal scholars? The main reason, I 
think, is that those considering early extraterritoriality have tended to focus 
on the federal government’s exercise of war powers rather than law 
enforcement.28 But war was an exceptional legal state. Americans 
understood that enemies were different than those suspected of violating 
municipal (i.e., domestic) law. While the early understanding of due 
process during war has yet to be fully explored, the evidence suggests that 
the government understood itself to be able to deprive members of enemy 
military forces of “life, liberty, or property” through the exercise of war 
powers without the ordinary constraints of due process.29 Studies that have 
focused on wartime deprivations have overlooked the evidence provided by 
the nation’s early law enforcement activities on the high seas. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the gap in the 
historical scholarship. Part II introduces the British and law of nations 
background. Part III discusses the implications of the U.S. Constitution’s 
structure and text. Parts IV and V present the early U.S. practice of law 
enforcement abroad, and Part VI explores implications of this history for 
contemporary constitutional doctrine. 
I.   A HOLE THE SIZE OF THE SEA 
The Due Process Clause appears to be “universalist”30—it provides 
without qualification that “[n]o person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”31 Based in part on this text, some 
 
 27 See infra Section V.C. 
 28 See infra Section I.B. 
 29 See infra Section V.B.3. 
 30 See NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 916 (describing universalism as an approach to constitutional 
interpretation requiring that “constitutional provisions that create rights with no express limitations as to 
the persons or places covered should be interpreted as applicable to every person and at every place”). 
 31 U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law—
The International Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. Investigators from 
Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 868 (2003). See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1957) 
(Black, J., plurality opinion) (“While it has been suggested that only those constitutional rights which 
are ‘fundamental’ protect Americans abroad, we can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking 
and choosing among the remarkable collection of ‘Thou shalt nots’ which were explicitly fastened on 
all departments and agencies of the Federal Government by the Constitution and its Amendments.”). 
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scholars and judges have argued that due process should presumptively 
extend abroad, at least to citizens and aliens who are otherwise subject to 
U.S. law.32 
Scholars have generally agreed, however, that the early history 
contradicts the apparently plain meaning of the Due Process Clause. They 
argue that background principles of law and politics, coupled with early 
U.S. military action abroad, show that Americans did not believe due 
process extended beyond the nation’s borders, at least not for aliens.33 
As this Part explains, no one has carefully explored the most salient 
historical evidence: early American law enforcement on the high seas, 
understood in light of the English historical background.  
A.   Background Political and Legal Principles 
Some scholars have concluded that early Americans did not 
understand constitutional rights to extend beyond the nation’s borders 
based on background principles of politics and law. The most fundamental 
of these was the social compact: Americans inherited the principle that a 
nation gains sovereignty from the consent of the governed.34 This principle 
raises a question about who is entitled to the protection of the law. Relying 
on the social compact, a handful of Americans argued during the debates 
over the Alien Acts of 1798 that only citizens are entitled to due process of 
law.35 Very few statesmen, even those who supported the Acts, adopted this 
position.36 For most Americans, the social compact principle did not, of its 
 
 32 See NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 99–102; see also Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 314 (2004) (“[T]he text of the U.S. Constitution constrains neither the political 
branches from acting abroad nor the judicial branch from reviewing their actions.”); Bryan William 
Horn, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Fifth Amendment Protection Against Coerced Self-
Incrimination, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 367, 375 (1992) (arguing that the language of the Fifth 
Amendment does not restrict itself to trials involving citizens or define any geographical limits); 
Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, Note, The Unavoidable Correlative: Extraterritorial Power and the United 
States Constitution, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 147, 197 (1999) (arguing that constitutional rights 
extend abroad if the agent of the United States alleged to have violated a right was acting in a sovereign 
capacity over the alleged victim). 
 33 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 34 See, e.g., EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. I, ch. I, § 1 (Béla Kapossy & Richard 
Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758) (“A nation or a state is, as has been said at the beginning of 
this work, a body politic, or a society of men united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual 
safety and advantage by their combined strength.”); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *47–48 
(suggesting that the community should guard the rights of each individual member in return for the 
individual submitting to the laws of the community). 
 35 NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 930–31. On the Alien and Sedition Acts generally, see JOHN C. 
MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM (1951). 
 36 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, 
at 257 (1996) (noting that this position “seems simply wrong”); see also NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 
937–43 (few endorsed it). 
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own accord, necessarily imply that the Constitution protected citizens 
alone.37 
Other scholars, including Philip Hamburger, have argued that the 
reciprocal loyalty principle—another longstanding principle in the common 
law and the law of nations—would have extended the Constitution’s 
protections not only to citizens but also to resident aliens.38 This principle 
placed a responsibility on the sovereign to provide the protection of the 
laws in exchange for political loyalty. This reciprocal relationship adhered 
between the sovereign and all subjects, including citizens and non-enemy 
resident aliens.39 This principle excluded nonresident aliens from the 
protection of the law including, at least implicitly, the Constitution. 
During the Alien Act debate, a number of Americans appear to have 
held some version of this view. John Marshall defended the Alien Friends 
Act on the ground that it authorized the President to dispense with ordinary 
protections of due process only for resident aliens suspected of being 
enemies or at least potential enemies.40 Apparently he believed that such 
suspicion was sufficient to remove aliens from the protection of some of 
the laws (including the basic requirements of due process). James Madison, 
who opposed the Alien Friends Act on the ground that it deprived alien 
friends of due process of law,41 nevertheless acknowledged that alien 
enemies—subjects of a nation with which the United States was in fact at 
war—were not entitled to the full protection of U.S. municipal (i.e., 
domestic) law.42 Most importantly for the purpose of this Article, the 
proponents of this view were not concerned with the extension of U.S. 
law—punitive or protective—outside U.S. borders. Rather, they were 
principally concerned with whether enemies, including those found within 
the United States, were entitled to constitutional protections. As this Article 
argues, the legal category that most determined one’s municipal rights, 
including the right to due process, was war—not location or nationality. 
During war, location and nationality often did make a difference. Outside 
 
 37 See NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 937–43. 
 38 See generally Hamburger, supra note 13. 
 39 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *365–75; VATTEL, supra note 34, bk. I, ch. XIV, § 213. 
 40 See NEUMAN, supra note 13 at 930–31 (discussing the Federalist Address to the Minority in the 
Virginia House, authored in part by Marshall and Henry Lee). 
 41 James Madison, Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 556–57 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (“Alien friends, except in 
the single case of public ministers, are under the municipal law, and must be tried and punished 
according to that law only.”). 
 42 NEUMAN, supra note 13 at 936–37. 
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of war, the government was bound by the ordinary requirements of due 
process. 
A third principle relied upon by those who argue against the 
extraterritorial application of the Constitution is the principle of territorial 
sovereignty.43 Under the law of nations at the time of the Founding, and 
under international law today, a nation’s legislative and judicial jurisdiction 
within its own territory is exclusive.44 This means that ordinarily a nation 
cannot exercise authority over conduct within another nation’s territory. 
There have always been important exceptions: nations may govern the 
conduct of their own subjects (and perhaps others) on the high seas45 and 
nations may govern the conduct of those within another nation’s sovereign 
territory with that sovereign’s consent (usually by treaty).46 
The implication of this principle for constitutional extraterritoriality is 
straightforward. The Due Process Clause is a law that does not purport to 
apply extraterritorially—why should it be understood to do so? Based in 
part on this principle, for instance, in 1891 the Supreme Court held that a 
U.S. consular tribunal that punished a U.S. seaman for violating Japan’s 
law in Japanese waters did not have to comply with the Bill of Rights.47 
The Court reasoned that the law of Japan, not the U.S. Constitution, 
governs conduct in Japan.48 
This conclusion does not follow from the principle of territorial 
sovereignty, however. U.S. law clearly did apply in Japan—it was U.S. law 
 
 43 See, e.g., In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (“By the [C]onstitution a government is ordained 
and established ‘for the United States of America,’ and not for countries outside their limits.”). 
 44 See VATTEL, supra note 34, Preliminaries, §§ 4, 15; David L. Sloss et al., Conclusion: 
Continuity and Change Over Two Centuries, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
589, 599 (Sloss et al. eds., 2011) (“[T]he presumption against extraterritoriality was born from the 
marriage of the Charming Betsy canon to customary international law rules limiting each nation’s 
jurisdiction (with a few exceptions) to its own territory.”); Stephane Beaulac, Vattel’s Doctrine on 
Territory Transfers in International Law and the Cession of Louisiana to the United States of America, 
63 LA. L. REV. 1327, 1340 (2003) (Vattel was responsible for the “externalization of sovereignty”); see 
also id. bk I, ch. I, § 4, ch. 3, § 37; id. bk. II, ch. IV, § 54. 
 45 In an early case, a litigant before the Supreme Court “conceded that the legislation of every 
country is territorial; that beyond its own territory, it can only affect its own subjects or citizens.” Rose 
v. Himely, 8 U.S. 241, 279 (1808) (Marshall, C.J.). The concession was not material to the case’s 
resolution. See id. at 281 (Livingston, J., joined by Cushing, J., & Chase, J., concurring in the 
judgment). A majority of the Court was so reluctant to subscribe to such a limitation on a sovereign’s 
right to govern conduct of nonsubjects on the high seas that they either expressly declined to take a 
position on the issue, see id., or argued for an entirely different framework, see id. at 288 (Johnson, J., 
dissenting) (“Within their jurisdictional limits the rights of sovereignty are exclusive; upon the ocean 
they are concurrent.”). As this Article discusses in Section V.A, by the 1820s, Congress exercised 
authority to punish piracy committed by some nonsubjects on the high seas, and the courts acquiesced. 
 46 See, e.g., infra Part IV. 
 47 In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 464. 
 48 Id. 
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that authorized the consular tribunal to exercise any U.S. authority 
whatsoever. The question, then, was whether the Bill of Rights places 
limits on that authority, or, alternatively, whether the Bill of Rights stops at 
the borders, even when the Constitution’s power-creating provisions go 
abroad.49 
Early Americans subscribed to each of the foregoing principles—the 
social compact, reciprocal loyalty and protection, and exclusive territorial 
sovereignty—at some level of abstraction, for some purposes. These 
principles therefore formed part of the framework for the American 
understanding of constitutional extraterritoriality. But the principles were 
not determinative. As scholars of empire have shown, early modern nation-
states like the United States struggled to understand the relationship 
between these three principles as they asserted various degrees of dominion 
and sovereignty over a patchwork of territory around the globe.50 Most 
importantly, Americans integrated these principles into their understanding 
of their new constitutional system, one with a federal government with 
powers that were limited both inherently and by express provisions like the 
Due Process Clause. 
B.   Distinguishing Law Enforcement from War 
Scholars have also explored constitutional extraterritoriality by 
looking to the early extraterritorial conduct of the U.S. military. Andrew 
Kent, a “pioneer in the field,”51 has made the most thorough historical case 
against the extraterritoriality of due process.52 U.S. military operations 
abroad, including those with the purpose of enforcing U.S. law, “were 
governed by international law, diplomacy, and policy judgments, not the 
Constitution.”53 In analyzing the historical evidence and coming to this 
conclusion, however, Kent blurred the line between war and law 
 
 49 See NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 944. 
 50 See DAVID ARMITAGE, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 94 (2000) (“[T]he 
problem of united imperium and dominium . . . [was] the fundamentally and ultimately combustible 
dilemma at the core of the British imperial ideology.”); LAUREN BENTON, SEARCHING FOR 
SOVEREIGNTY 4 (2010); CHARLES MAIER, AMONG EMPIRES 101 (2006). 
 51 Martin Flaherty, The Constitution Follows the Drone, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 35 (2015) 
(noting that “serious historical scholarship on Founding views and early practice concerning the 
extraterritorial reach of the Constitution to potential noncitizen belligerents has only just gotten 
underway”). 
 52 See Kent, supra note 13, at 528–35. 
 53 Id. at 536; see also id. at 526 (“[T]here was a strong current of opinion that treaties and the law 
of nations provided the legal framework governing the U.S. government’s action abroad, at least in the 
absence of contrary congressional regulation.”); id. (“It does not appear that extraterritorial coercive 
force by the United States government was thought to implicate constitutional rights of noncitizens.”). 
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enforcement.54 This is understandable; there is a fair amount of evidence of 
early wartime extraterritorial military operations, and given the perennial 
importance of the Constitution’s proper application during war, that 
evidence has been well researched.55 Furthermore, scholars who have most 
recently looked at the historical evidence have done so with an eye for its 
implications for the war on terror, a conflict that blurs traditional lines 
between war and law enforcement. 
Unfortunately, focusing on war muddies the historical analysis. Late 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Americans understood war to be 
an exceptional legal state. Under the law of nations, war upended the rights 
and duties of belligerent and neutral states and their subjects.56 The 
Suspension Clause and the Third Amendment respectively permit the 
federal government to exercise extraordinary power to protect Americans 
during “[r]ebellion or [i]nvasion”57 or “in time of war”58—power that would 
ordinarily violate due process of law.59 To show that waging war abroad 
reflects the inapplicability of due process abroad would require first 
showing that the exercise of power to wage war (anywhere) was subject to 
the ordinary requirements of due process.60 If the question is whether due 
process applies abroad, asking whether it applies to the exercise of war 
powers abroad puts the cart before the horse. Better to inquire first whether 
due process applied to the conduct of U.S. officers abroad when they 
enforced U.S. law. 
Other scholars have discussed aspects of the U.S. law of piracy and 
the slave trade in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but 
none of them have reflected upon the implications of their evidence for the 
extraterritoriality of due process.61 This is a significant lacuna in the 
 
 54 Id. at 536 (war and law enforcement “do not appear to have been always neatly distinguished”). 
 55 The gold standard is ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976); see also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in 
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 689 (2008). 
 56 See Section V.B.3. See generally The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 667 (1862); Ware v. Hylton, 
3 U.S. 199, 224 (1796) (Chase, J.). 
 57 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 58 U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 59 See, e.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, C.J.). 
 60 See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress, 
113 MICH. L. REV. 1337 (2015). 
 61 See generally DOUGLAS R. BURGESS, JR., THE PIRATES’ PACT (2009) (exploring the legally 
dubious alliances between pirates and colonial American governors); DAVID HEAD, PRIVATEERS OF THE 
AMERICAS 7–8 (2015); ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY, at chs. 3–4 (2d ed. 1998); Eugene 
Kontorovich, The Constitutionality of International Courts, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 79–85, 90–92 
(2009); Jenny S. Martinez, International Courts and the U.S. Constitution, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 
1072 (2011). 
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historical evidence of early federal constitutionalism. The new government 
took its rights and duties under the law of nations quite seriously62 and 
devoted significant resources to law enforcement on the high seas.63 
Moreover, Americans inhabited a trans-Atlantic maritime culture; they 
were intimately acquainted with the law of maritime commerce, prize, 
piracy, and the fine distinctions among them.64 Though the topic may seem 
antiquated, it was a priority of the early federal government.65 As the next 
Parts of this Article argue, the historical evidence strongly suggests that 
Americans understood all those suspected of violating U.S. law—
anywhere—to be entitled to due process of law before the government 
could deprive them of “life, liberty, or property.” 
II.   THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DUE PROCESS ABROAD 
Looking at due process through the facet of law enforcement abroad, 
rather than war, brings the relevant historical material into focus. 
Americans inherited their understanding of how to implement the U.S.’s 
rights and duties under the law of nations, including the rights and duties of 
law enforcement on the high seas, from British constitutionalism. Despite 
its admiralty origins, English courts had long tried piracy cases according 
to what Sir William Blackstone called “the common law of the land”—with 
a grand jury indictment, a petit jury trial, and the procedural and 
evidentiary requirements of the common law.66 Pirates thus received the 
same due process as other criminals tried in the common law courts. Britain 
departed from this practice in the colonies, however, subjecting pirates to 
trial by vice-admiralty commissions that proceeded on ship or land 
according to the civil law. As we shall see, the U.S. government rejected 
this approach. Under the Constitution and federal statute, every criminal 
 
 62 See, e.g., David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American 
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 
932 (2010); David L. Sloss et al., International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 44 at 7. 
 63 See HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 215 (identifying admiralty and maritime offenses as over 
30% of all criminal indictments). 
 64 See generally 1 THE AMERICAN SHIP-MASTER’S DAILY ASSISTANT; OR, COMPENDIUM OF 
MARINE LAW, AND MERCANTILE REGULATIONS AND CUSTOMS (1807) (including chapters on each of 
those topics); see also DONALD A. PETRIE, THE PRIZE GAME (1999) (describing the origins of the law 
of maritime prize). 
 65 See HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 215; see also 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. 
JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN 
MARSHALL, 1801–1815, at 407 (1981) (noting that “[t]he early years of the Marshall Court were 
dominated by the influx of appeals from prosecutions for illegal trade and by prize cases arising during 
the War of 1812 . . . amounting to at least 32 percent of all [Supreme Court] cases” from 1801–1815). 
 66 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at*67. 
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suspect was entitled to a grand jury indictment, a jury trial, and the 
procedural protections of the common law, including those accused of 
offenses on the high seas. 
A.   The Piracy–Prize Dichotomy Under the Law of Nations 
Before examining the application of British law on the high seas, it is 
important to first understand the “law of nations.” In its simplest 
formulation, the law of nations was “the science which teaches the rights 
subsisting between nations or states, and the obligations correspondent to 
those rights.”67 Where did those rights and duties come from? By the time 
of the War for Independence, English-speaking lawyers generally 
understood the law of nations to be “the rules of natural law” applied to the 
relationships between sovereign states, along with “mutual compacts, 
treaties, leagues and agreements between these several communities.”68 The 
law of nations stood in contrast to a state’s “municipal law,” or “a rule of 
civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding 
what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.”69 
Though jurists generally conceived of the law of nations and 
municipal law as separate categories of law, they understood them to be 
dynamically related. According to Blackstone, the law of nations “is held to 
be a part of the law of the land” because it was “adopted in its full extent by 
the common law.”70 The “law-merchant” applied in mercantile cases and 
the rules of capture applied in prize cases, shipwrecks, and the like.71 There 
were also three “principal offences against the law of nations, animadverted 
on as such by the municipal law of England”: “1. Violation of safe-
conducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of embassadors; and, 3. Piracy.”72 
By the late eighteenth century, therefore, it was not unusual for common 
law jurists to state that “the law of nations” was not only applied in English 
 
 67 VATTEL, supra note 34, Preliminaries, § 3. 
 68 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *43; see also VATTEL, supra note 34, Preliminaries § 6 (“[T]he 
law of nations is originally no other than the law of nature applied to nations.”); id. §§ 24–25 
(discussing the “law of nations, called conventional, or of treaties” and the “customary law of nations, 
or the custom of nations”). 
 69 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *44. 
 70 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *67 (“[T]hose acts of parliament which have from time to time 
been made to enforce this universal law, or to facilitate the execution of its decisions, are not to be 
considered as introductive of any new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental 
constitutions of the kingdom, without which it must cease to be a part of the civilized world.”). 
 71 Id.  
 72 Id. at *68. 
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courts, alongside municipal law, but that it “[was] part of the laws of 
England.”73 
Importantly, the law of nations emerged from sixteenth-century 
conflicts among the western maritime nations over privateering and piracy 
on global trade routes.74 The source of these conflicts was often the capture 
of a merchant ship laden with cargo bound for Europe from the East or 
West Indies.75 Whether another sovereign had sanctioned the capture made 
all the difference. If so, it was an act of war. The victim’s sovereign could 
respond in kind by issuing a letter of reprisal authorizing a privateer to prey 
upon the enemy’s merchant vessels up to the amount of the damages. In 
some cases, the first capture could even be considered a declaration of war. 
If no sovereign had authorized the capture, however, it was an act of 
piracy. The pirate was, at least in theory, an “enemy of all,” liable to be put 
to death by anyone who captured him.76 
The economics of privateering guaranteed a steady supply of pirates—
it was big business.77 To supplement public warships, a sovereign would 
commission private ships to prey on enemy merchants. A commissioned 
privateer would capture a ship that appeared to be within the authorization 
of the commission (usually an enemy) and place a “prize crew,” including a 
prize master, on board the captured ship, and the prize crew would sail the 
captured vessel to an admiralty court of the sovereign that had issued the 
commission.78 The sovereign would libel (formally prosecute) the ship and 
its cargo, and the admiralty court would determine whether it was a good 
prize—whether it was within the scope of the privateer’s commission. If so, 
the admiralty court would condemn the ship and cargo, order it sold, and 
distribute the proceeds according to law. In England, the prize belonged to 
the Crown, but the Crown shared it voluntarily with the lords of admiralty 
and with the privateer master and crew according to statute or according to 
the terms of the commission.79 
 
 73 2 RICHARD WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 421 (1792). 
 74 See David Armitage, Introduction to HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA xi, xi–xx (David Armitage 
ed., Richard Hakluyt trans., Liberty Fund 2004) (1609). 
 75 See id. 
 76 See generally DANIEL HELLER-ROAZEN, THE ENEMY OF ALL: PIRACY AND THE LAW OF 
NATIONS 16 (2009) (discussing the Ciceronian origin of the notion that pirates are the “common enemy 
of all”); RUBIN, supra note 61, at ch. 2; WOODDESON, supra note 73, at 421–57. 
 77 See generally JAMES G. LYDON, PIRATES, PRIVATEERS, AND PROFITS (1970) (discussing the 
centrality of privateering for the economic development of New York in the eighteenth century). 
 78 See PETRIE, supra note 64, at 37–38. 
 79 The richest collection of commissions and opinions in early prize cases is found in volumes 1 
and 2 of DOCUMENTS RELATING TO LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA (R.G. Marsden ed., 1915–16) and 
volumes 1 and 2 of SELECT PLEAS OF THE HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY (R.G. Marsden ed., 1892, 
1897). 
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During times of peace, privateering commissions were far harder to 
come by. Privateering was after all an act of war or reprisal. Some 
privateers were not content to return to trade, however. Thus some 
percentage of them continued to capture merchant vessels without 
sovereign authority—as pirates.80 
Because of the politics and economics of captures on the high seas, 
nations had reason to enforce piracy laws and to do so with care. Allowing 
foreign pirates to prey on merchants was simply bad for business. At the 
same time, a nation could hardly tolerate its own subjects attacking foreign 
vessels; it invited suspicion (sometimes well-founded) that the sovereign 
was encouraging the attacks.81 
Prosecuting foreign pirates, however, carried its own risks. Suppose 
the defendant had been acting under the orders of another sovereign. Given 
the legal and diplomatic implications, this is something the prosecuting 
nation would want to know. First, the authorizing sovereign had committed 
an act of war. The victim’s sovereign’s rights and duties of war had been 
triggered. Second, as a consequence, the defendant was a prisoner of war, 
not a criminal, and as such entitled to the protections of the law of war. 
Executing the defendant as a pirate could violate the law of war and 
complicate diplomatic efforts.82 
Such were the dynamics of piracy and prize in the early modern era. 
Although all the western maritime powers generally embraced the law of 
nations principles that gave rise to these dynamics, as we shall see, each 
state implemented its rights and duties according to its own constitution. 
B.   Blackstone: Pirates Entitled to the “Law of the Land” 
Since the sixteenth century, England had prosecuted pirates according 
to the common law. Under Acts of Parliament dating to 1535 and 1536, ad 
hoc commissions, not the court of admiralty, tried crimes committed on the 
high seas according “to the course of the common law.”83 Sitting as 
“Admiralty Sessions,” these commissions ordinarily included common law 
 
 80 See HEAD, supra note 61, at 92. 
 81 See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE supra note 16, at *68 (“It is therefore incumbent upon the nation 
injured, first to demand satisfaction and justice to be done on the offender, by the state to which he 
belongs; and, if that be refused or neglected, the sovereign then avows himself an accomplice or abettor 
of his subject’s crime, and draws upon his community the calamities of foreign war.”). 
 82 See, e.g., Palachie’s Case, 81 Eng. Rep. 411 (1615) (K.B.) (Coke, C.J.) (holding that “if the 
taking was by an enemy it was not robbery but lawful capture”); see also RUBIN, supra note 61, at 63. 
 83 27 Hen. 8 c. 4 (1535); 28 Hen. 8 c. 15 (1536); see M.J. Prichard & D.E.C. Yale, Introduction to 
HALE AND FLEETWOOD ON ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION, at cxxxvii (M.J. Prichard & D.E.C. Yale eds., 
1993). The statutes both provide that a number of crimes would be punishable “in like form and 
condition as if such offences had been done upon the land.” 27 Hen. 8 c. 4 & c. 15. 
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and civilian judges.84 By statute, they proceeded according to common law 
procedures: indictment by a grand jury and verdict by a petit jury.85 
Leading legal historians have missed the implications of this statute 
for the development of due process. The principal contemporary textbook 
on the history of the common law is, at best, imprecise: “[t]he admiralty 
courts dealt with maritime affairs, including crimes committed on the high 
seas . . . .”86 Theodore Plucknett was less accurate when he concluded that 
the Acts of 1536 “inaugurated the new policy of strengthening Admiralty 
by confirming its jurisdiction over crime committed on the seas, and 
permitting trial by jury.”87 To the contrary, the statute all but divested 
admiralty of control over crimes committed on the high seas. Instead of 
trial by admiralty judge according to the civil law, ad hoc commissions 
comprised of common law and civil law judges would preside over grand 
and petit juries and would proceed according to the common law.88 It is true 
that the cases “arose at admiralty” in the sense that, because the facts 
giving rise to the suits occurred on the high seas, the case was within the 
admiralty jurisdiction. More importantly, however, the Acts of 1535 and 
1536 effectively extended Magna Carta’s “law of the land” protection to 
those accused of crimes on the high seas.89 Due process had set sail. 
 
 84 28 Hen. 8 c. 15 (1536) (providing that each commission shall include the Lord High Admiral, a 
delegate, or the Warden of the Cinque Ports, “and three or four such other substantial persons as shall 
be named by the lord chancellor for the time being”); see also Rex v. Dawson, 13 How. St. Tr. 451, 451 
(1696) (commission included Doctor Charles Hedges (President and Judge of the Admiralty), Sir John 
Holt (Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench), Sir George Treby (Lord Chief Justice of the Common 
Pleas), Sir Edward Ward (Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer), three other judges of the King’s Bench, 
a justice of the Common Pleas, and a baron of the Exchequer, along with sundry knights “named in the 
said Commission”); Trial of William Kidd, 14 How. St. Tr. 123 (1701) (similar). 
 85 See 28 Hen. 8 c. 15 (1536); see also SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 77 (5th ed. 
1716) (“The Stat. 28 H. 8 alters not the offence; but it remains only an offence by the Civil Law: and 
therefore a pardon of all Felonies doth not discharge it: but it gives a trial by the course of the Common 
Law.”). 
 86 JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 196 (2009) (citing George F. 
Steckley, Collisions, Prohibitions, and the Admiralty Court in Seventeenth-Century London, 21 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 41, 42–43 (2003)). 
 87 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 662 (5th ed. 1956). 
 88 M.J. Prichard, Crime at Sea: Admiralty Sessions and the Background to Later Colonial 
Jurisdiction, 8 DALHOUSIE L.J. 43, 44–45 (1984). 
 89 See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 111 
(London, E. & R. Brooke 1797) (1628) (describing piracy as acts occurring at sea “which by an act of 
Parliament are to be enquired of, heard, and determined according to the course of the common law, as 
if they had been done upon the land”). Professor Burgess has argued that the Crown and Parliament 
wrestled over authority to define and punish piracy in the early sixteenth to late seventeenth centuries, 
with Parliament taking the side of the common law courts and the Crown taking the side of the 
admiralty court. See DOUGLAS R. BURGESS, JR., THE POLITICS OF PIRACY 18–22 (2014). By the 
eighteenth century, anyway, it appears that British piracy suppression was regulated entirely by statute. 
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By the late eighteenth century, Blackstone could confidently assert 
that pirates were entitled to “the common law of the land.” 
Formerly [piracy] was only cognizable by the admiralty courts, which proceed 
by the rules of the civil law. But it being inconsistent with the liberties of the 
nation that any man’s life should be taken away, unless by the judgment of his 
peers or the common law of the land, the statute 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15 
established a new jurisdiction for this purpose, which proceeds according to 
the course of the common law . . . .90 
Blackstone here references Magna Carta’s famed “law of the land” 
provision,91 which became the textual origin of the English and American 
constitutional guarantee that the government may deprive someone of life, 
liberty, or property, only with “due process of law.”92 English common 
lawyers had long equated the “law of the land” provision with “due 
process,” and the early American state and federal constitutional traditions 
treated those legal requirements interchangeably.93 From the standpoint of 
late eighteenth-century English and American readers, Blackstone’s 
summary of the constitutional limits on the punishment of piracy could not 
have been more clear: pirates and others who committed offenses on the 
high seas were entitled to due process of law. 
C.   The Colonial Exception 
At the same time, Americans would have been keenly aware that 
Blackstone was writing about the rights enjoyed only by those tried in 
Britain. Pirates were not entitled to a common law trial in the British 
colonies. In 1699, Parliament provided that “piracy, robbery, or felony 
upon the sea” could be tried in the colonies by a special commission at sea 
 
See Prichard, supra note 88, at 57 (discussing the background of a 1699 statute authorizing the trial of 
piracy in the colonies by “inquisitorial procedure, not by jury”). 
 90 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *71. 
 91 For commentary and sources, see Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1682–85 (“Chapter 
29 of Magna Carta provided that ‘[n]o free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, 
banished, or in any way destroyed . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers [or/and] by the law of 
the land.’”). 
 92 See id. at 1682–92. On the importance of the “myth” of the Great Charter for “all the 
[seventeenth century] forces of liberalism” and English and American constitutionalism in general, see 
PLUCKNETT, supra note 87, at 25. 
 93 See EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 
(photo. reprint 2004) (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1642) (equating Chapter 29 of Magna Carta 
with 28 Edw. 3 c.3 (1354), which first articulated due process as a limit on governmental deprivations); 
Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1714 (discussing Hamilton’s equation of “law of the land” 
and “due process” as limits on state legislatures). 
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or land that proceeded according to the civil law.94 The statute did not alter 
the common law protections for those tried in Britain under the Act of 
1536; it applied only abroad.95 The point was to provide a “strict and more 
easy way” to suppress the pirates that were harassing British shipping 
interests near the colonies.96 The statute shows that Parliament did not 
hesitate to depart from common law protections for pirates for the sake of 
expediency.97 (Parliament was not, of course, subject to a written 
constitution that it could not change by ordinary statute.)98 Free of “the 
obstructionism of the colonial courts,”99 British officers prosecuted dozens 
 
 94 An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 1700, 11 Will. 3 c. 7, reprinted in 
3 BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE, supra note 17, at 25 (noting that in 1684 England determined 
that under existing law “colonial courts lacked the jurisdiction to try pirates”); Peter T. Leeson, 
Rationality, Pirates, and the Law: A Retrospective, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1219, 1222–24 (2010). 
 95 2 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA: A.D. 1649–1767, at xx 
(Marsden ed., Navy Records Society 1916) [hereinafter 2 LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA]. There seems 
to have been some confusion among British lawyers about whether the 1536 act and the 1699 act could 
be enforced, according to their respective procedural requirements, in the colonies. In 1718, an 
Admiralty Session in South Carolina tried William Bonnett and others for offenses under the Act of 
1536 and adhered to its procedural requirements. The Trials of Major Stede Bonnet, and Thirty-three 
others, at the Court of Vice-Admiralty, at Charles-Town, in South-Carolina, for Piracy (1718), in 
15 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1231 (David Jardine ed, 1812). Two years 
later Richard West delivered an opinion to the lords commissioners of trade and plantations, arguing 
that “the statute of Henry the eighth does not extend to the West Indies.” Richard West, Opinion on the 
Admiralty Jurisdiction, in the Plantations (June 20, 1720), in OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS ON 
VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 200, 204 (George Chalmers ed., 1814). 
 96 11 Will. 3 c. 7; see Prichard, supra note 88 at 57. 
 97 See Quelch Trial, 14 How. St. Tr. 1067, 1073–74 (1704) (statement of Paul Dudley, Attorney-
General of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay). In Quelch, the first trial under the Act of 1700, 
Attorney-General Dudley is reported to have made inconsistent statements about the rights of pirates. 
After arguing that one who captures pirates “may expose them immediately to punishment, by hanging 
them at the mainyard,” id. at 1073, he acknowledged the protections afforded to pirates under the piracy 
statutes of Henry VIII, and discussed the new Act of 1699 as a modest departure from those 
longstanding rules, see id. at 1074. I think his assertion about hanging pirates at the mainyard is best 
understood either as an argument about the rights of captors to immediately execute judgment on pirates 
in a state of nature or as a rhetorical flourish designed to soften the blow of the Act of 1699 as a 
departure from the protections of the common law. “Besides,” he added, “the late statute [the Act of 
1699] hath appointed such commissioners, as will take care to do equal justice to the prisoner on the 
one hand, and to the crown and allies of England on the other.” Id. at 1074. On the Quelch prosecution, 
see BURGESS, supra note 89, at 210–213. 
 98 See generally J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1955) 
(discussing different ideas about limits on parliamentary power in the 1700s). By the time of the 
Revolution, it was widely accepted that Parliament was sovereign, its lawmaking power beyond 
constraint. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *90–91; 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 94 (1978). 
 99 See, e.g., BURGESS, supra note 89, at 210. 
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of pirates in the North American colonies by special commissions 
according to the civil law.100 
Furthermore, British practice under the Act of 1699 confirms that 
while Parliament could depart from its prior decisions, the prosecution of 
pirates was nonetheless subject to the requirements of municipal law. 
Apparently, in 1720 the King’s commanders and naval officers queried 
whether they could be commissioned to try pirates “at any place on the 
high seas at large,” rather than in a colonial port.101 The Crown’s law 
officers concluded that the statute of Henry VIII had affirmatively divested 
the admiralty of jurisdiction over the prosecution of pirates and required 
their prosecution in England “by the common course of the laws of the 
land.”102 The Act of 1699 departed from this for pirates captured in the East 
or West Indies, allowing trial “in some colony or plantacon [sic] in the 
parts where they are taken.”103 The officers concluded, however, that “the 
intent” of the Act of 1699 was to require coordination between the captors 
(usually naval officers) and officers “in some plantacons” or 
of some English factory, where, or on the sea adjoyning thereto, such 
commission should be executed, and that a certain place should be specially 
appointed in such commission for the execution thereof, which will not be 
complyed with by a commission to be executed in any place at large upon the 
sea.104 
Such a commission, they concluded, “ought not by law to be granted.”105 
The British tradition the Americans inherited was that the prosecution of 
offenses at sea, by whatever procedure, was subject to the specific 
requirements of municipal law. 
 
 100 See, e.g., The Trial of Eight Persons Indicted for Piracy &c (Boston, B. Green for John 
Edwards, 1718); The Trials of Five Persons for Piracy, Felony and Robbery (Boston, T. Fleet for S. 
Gerrish, 1726); An Account of the Pirates, with Divers of Their Speeches, Letters, &c., and a Poem 
Made by One of Them: Who Were Executed at Newport, Rhode Island, July 19, 1723 (Newport, 1723) 
reprinted in 7 R.I. HIST. MAG., 1886-87, at 259 (recounting the execution of twenty-six pirates who had 
resisted arrest and then surrendered on the high seas); The Tryals of Sixteen Persons for Piracy, &c. 
Four of Which Were Found Guilty, and the Rest Acquitted (Boston, Joseph Edwards, 1726); An Account 
of the Trial of Joseph Andrews for Piracy and Murder (New York, 1769) (vice admiralty trial and 
execution in New York); see also BURGESS, supra note 89, at 222–24 (describing several trials for 
piracy in the early 1700s). 
 101 Opinion of the Law Officers as to the Validity of a Commission to Try Pirates Anywhere on the 
Sea, Addressed to Commanders and Officers of H.M. Ships (1720), in 2 LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA, 
supra note 95, at 253. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 254. 
 105 Id. 
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Americans, for their part, resented trial by colonial vice-admiralty 
courts when the defendant would have been entitled to trial by jury 
according to the common law in England (most notably in cases arising 
under the Stamp Act).106 As we shall see, Congress never attempted to 
follow Parliament’s lead by authorizing the trial of pirates by an 
extraordinary legal process. Throughout the early years of the federal 
republic, the U.S. commitment to due process for pirates, wherever in the 
world they were apprehended, stood in stark contrast to the British 
approach of trying them by the closest possible specially commissioned 
court. The difference was the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers, and 
its requirement of due process of law. 
D.   The United States Joins the Nations 
1.   The War for Independence 
During the War for Independence, Americans became familiar with 
how a nation’s “municipal” or domestic law could determine the boundary 
between lawful privateering and piracy. Privateers played a crucial role in 
the war. From the earliest days, American merchants fitted out their ships 
for reprisals against British merchants.107 By one estimate in the House of 
Lords, American privateers “captured or destroyed” over 700 ships with 
cargoes “worth over ten million dollars,”108 or well over three times the 
number of ships taken by the Continental Navy.109 “Over the course of the 
War, 1,697 privateer ships manned by 58,400 men roamed the seas.”110 
Spurred by a blend of patriotism and a quest for fortune, American 
privateers converted the wealth of British imperial trade into the “old 
money” of the eastern seaboard.111 
All of this was entirely lawful—from the Americans’ perspective. 
Midway through the war—as American privateers harassed British ships in 
 
 106 See 1 JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 52 
(2003); see also 1  GOEBEL, supra note 98, at 52; Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial 
Vice-Admiralty Courts (Part II), 27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 323, 334–35 (1996); J. Franklin Jameson, The 
Predecessor of the Supreme Court, in ESSAYS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD 1775–1789, at 5 (1889); David S. Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality: 
The Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 1764–1776, 16 WM. & MARY Q. 459, 460–61 
(1959); Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1720 (2009). 
 107 See 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 371 (1775). 
 108 EDGAR STANTON MACLAY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRIVATEERS, at viii–ix (1899); see also 
Deirdre Mask & Paul MacMahon, The Revolutionary War Prize Cases and the Origins of Diversity 
Jurisdiction, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 477, 487 n.38 (2015). 
 109 Mask & MacMahon, supra note 108, at 487. 
 110 Id. at 488. 
 111 See ROBERT H. PATTON, PATRIOT PIRATES 115 (2008); Mask & MacMahon, supra note 108, at 
488. 
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the Irish Sea, the North Sea, and elsewhere in Europe—Britain declined to 
treat captured American privateers as prisoners of war. In 1777, Parliament 
enacted The Pirate Act, which authorized the Crown “to secure and detain 
persons charged with, or suspected of, the crime of high treason committed 
in North America, or on the high seas, or the crime of piracy.”112 Britain did 
not recognize America as a sovereign state, so it likewise did not recognize 
Congress’s authority to authorize privateers. Without authority, the 
privateers were pirates. Britain’s decision illustrates the degree to which a 
nation’s view of the legality of captures at sea depended on its own 
municipal law, which in some cases depended on its own political interests. 
Indeed, after its alliance with the United States, France allowed Benjamin 
Franklin to sit as an admiralty judge in prize cases brought into French port 
by American privateers.113 Ultimately George III’s strategy of treating 
American rebels as common criminals proved unpopular and eroded 
support for the costly war at home.114 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the Continental Congress tried to 
ensure that American privateers complied with the law of nations, acting 
within the authority of their commissions and receiving the prize to which 
they were lawfully due. To this end, Congress passed a series of resolves 
that lodged appellate jurisdiction over state prize courts in a 
congressionally appointed court that became progressively more stable and 
independent.115 The rebels’ experience with this court ultimately provided 
the basis for the Constitution’s delegation of admiralty jurisdiction to the 
federal courts.116 
2.   The Articles of Confederation 
Under the Articles of Confederation, the United States took halting 
steps toward what would ultimately be the Constitution’s structural 
arrangement for adjudicating cases arising on the high seas. The Articles of 
Confederation formally delegated much of the new federation’s “external 
sovereignty” to Congress.117 Article IX gave Congress power to “appoint[ ] 
courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and 
establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all 
 
 112 17 Geo. 3 c. 9 (1777). The statute was extended annually until January 1, 1783. See 18 Geo. 3 c. 
1 (1778); 19 Geo. 3 c. 1 (1779); 20 Geo. 3 c. 5 (1780); 21 Geo. 3 c. 2 (1781); 22 Geo. 3 c. 1 (1782). 
 113 PETRIE, supra note 64 at 62. 
 114 See generally E. GORDON BOWEN-HASSELL ET AL., SEA RAIDERS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (2003); RICHARD BUEL JR., IN IRONS (1998). 
 115 See GOEBEL, supra note 98, at ch. 4 (discussing this development). 
 116 See generally id. (discussing the initial creation of appellate jurisdiction based on the appeals 
court for cases of capture). 
 117 See Penhallow v. Doane’s Admin’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 91 (1795). 
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cases of capture.”118 Rather than establishing such courts, however, 
Congress passed an ordinance that delegated jurisdiction in piracy cases to 
courts to be created by the states.119 Many states enacted such statutes,120 but 
the practice under them is unclear. Upon motion by James Madison, 
Congress considered, and ultimately rejected, the idea of appointing the 
judges of the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture to also try cases of 
piracy.121 
III.  THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Based on their experience during the War for Independence and under 
the Articles of Confederation, the constitutional framers understood that the 
exercise of power over “all matters and questions touching the law of 
nations”122 needed to be uniform, predictable, and controlled by the 
institutions responsible for discharging the nation’s duties.123 The Framers 
accordingly consolidated power over foreign affairs in the federal 
government. Section A provides a brief overview of how the Constitution 
delegated authority over these issues among the three federal departments. 
Section B considers the sparse historical evidence about the drafting history 
of the Define and Punish Clause of Article I, Section 8. I argue that the 
framers most likely intended to give Congress broad power to define and 
punish crimes on the high seas and against the law of nations without 
incorporating limits on that power from the definition of piracy and crimes 
under the law of nations. Section C summarizes the original understanding 
of due process. Contrary to the contemporary understanding, which sorts 
due process into “procedural,” “jurisdictional,” and “substantive” rights, 
Section C shows that early Americans understood due process to require 
that deprivations of “life, liberty, or property” be according to law. This 
 
 118 Id; see 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 283 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS] (June 18, 1787) (Madison) (explaining that at the Philadelphia 
convention, Hamilton listed “cases of piracy” as an example where the federal government already 
exercised authority over individuals). 
 119 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 354–56 (Apr. 5, 1781). 
 120 See, e.g., 5 STAT. AT LARGE OF S.C. (Feb. 27, 1788); MASS ACTS AND RESOLVES, Jan. Sess. 
1783, c. 10. 
 121 GOEBEL, supra note 98, at 173. 
 122 13 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 281–84 (Mar. 5, 1779) (letter from Congress to 
the states). 
 123 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) (Jay, C.J.) (“[T]he United States had, by 
taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations, and it was their 
interest as well as their duty to provide that those laws should be respected and obeyed . . . .”); see also 
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J.) (“When the United States declared its 
independence, it was bound to receive the law of nations in its modern state of purity and refinement.”). 
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would include compliance with the constitutional separation of powers and 
applicable court procedures. 
A.   Structural Overview 
The Constitution distributes authority over matters that touch on the 
nation’s rights and responsibilities under the law of nations, including law 
enforcement abroad. Seeing the big picture provides context for 
understanding early discussion and practice relevant to the extraterritorial 
reach of due process. Article I gives Congress power to make law that 
reaches beyond U.S. territory. Most obviously based on the text alone, it 
gives Congress power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies 
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”124 
and “[t]o . . . make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”125 
Congress has also asserted power to make law governing private conduct 
on the high seas under the Foreign Commerce Clause, among others.126  
Article II provides that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”127 It does not have a territorial limitation; apparently 
the President’s duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed is 
coterminous with the law. Article III extends “[t]he judicial Power” “to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction”128 and provides that “[t]he 
Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”129 
Article III expressly contemplates that crimes may be committed outside of 
a state and provides that in those cases “the Trial shall be at such Place or 
Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.”130 
 
 124 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 125 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 126 See, e.g., ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE 
252 (1803). 
 127 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 128 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This power was, according to James Wilson, “proper and unexceptionable 
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 41, at 445–46 (Wilson); see id. (pointing to the “ample experience we 
have had in the courts of admiralty with regard to captures”). The Virginia, New Jersey, and Hamilton 
plans all would have given power to federal courts over cases of piracy and captures at sea. 
1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 118, at 22 (May 29) (Madison); id. at 28 (May 29) (Madison, 
Paterson); id. at 211 (June 12) (Journal); id. at 244 (June 15) (Madison); id. at 292 (June 18) (Madison). 
 129 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 130 Id. In the Crimes Act of 1790, Congress provided that the trial of crimes committed outside any 
state shall be in the state where the defendant is brought or may be found. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 
§ 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14. 
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B.   The Define and Punish Power 
Section 8 of Article I gives Congress authority to “define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.”131 The Framers 
discussed several ways to write this clause. They appeared to agree about 
what they wanted it to mean; the question was how to avoid 
misunderstanding. The first draft said that Congress would “declare” the 
law and punishment for piracies and felonies on the high seas.132 Madison 
and Randolph, however, argued that “felony at common law is vague” and 
“defective” and, therefore, needed more clarity. Casting about for 
alternative formulas, they rejected “foreign law,” which they argued 
“should [not] be a standard farther than is expressly adopted”133 and “the 
laws of the states” because they lacked uniformity.134 During the ratification 
debates, Madison defended the generality of the final text with essentially 
the same arguments that he and Randolph had made in Philadelphia.135 
Besides this, and the light discussion about how best to give the federal 
courts jurisdiction over piracy and other cases arising on the high seas,136 
the constitutional framers and ratifiers had little to say about those 
crimes.137 
 
 131  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 132 2  FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 118, at 137, 143 (July 24–26) (Committee of Detail, IV) 
(Randolph’s hand); id. at 163, 168 (July 24–26) (Committee of Detail, IX) (Wilson’s hand); id. at 614 
(Sept. 14) (Madison). 
 133 Id. at 316 (Aug. 17) (Madison); see id. at 312–13 (Aug. 17) (Journal) (recording the votes). 
 134 Id. at 314, 316 (Aug. 17) (Madison). 
 135 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). In his essay, Madison appeared to depart from 
the arguments he made in Philadelphia in a couple of respects. The most important, and most puzzling, 
is that he opened his discussion of the Define and Punish Clause by asserting that “[t]he provision of the 
federal articles on the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further than to the establishment of 
courts for the trial of these offences.” Id. This argument does not square with the text of the Clause, 
which gives Congress power to “define and punish” those crimes, and it is also manifestly contrary to 
the rest of Madison’s argument about the Clause. Madison goes on to discuss the importance of giving 
Congress power to define felonies on the high seas because there was no standard definition. Id. The 
second possible departure from his position in Philadelphia is his vague assertion that “[t]he definition 
of piracies might, perhaps, without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations; though a legislative 
definition of them is found in most municipal codes.” Id. This reads as though Madison was ambivalent 
about whether the power to define piracies was “necessary and proper.” Id. Both of these somewhat 
strange arguments can be attributed to a desire during the ratification debates to soft-pedal Congress’s 
power to create new crimes. 
 136 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 118, at 135 (Committee of 
Detail, III) (introducing admiralty jurisdiction); id. at 146–47 (Committee of Detail, IV) (same); id. at 
157 (Committee of Detail, VII) (which still includes specific provision of jurisdiction over “all Cases of 
Capture from an Enemy—in all Cases of Piracies and Felonies on the high Seas”); id. at 172–73 
(Committee of Detail, IX) (consolidating the specific provisions into “all Cases of Admiralty and 
Maritime Jurisdiction”); id. at 186 (Aug. 6) (Madison) (same); id. at 432 (Aug. 27) (Mason) (same). 
 137 See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1160 
(1833) (stating that the Clause received little “serious” attention at Philadelphia); Eugene Kontorovich, 
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Given the English background, the language of the clause likely 
reflects the framers’ understanding that “piracy,” though sometimes 
reduced in both English law and the law of nations to “robbery on the high 
seas,” could also refer to other acts on the high seas made criminal by a 
nation’s municipal law.138 The provision gives Congress power to define 
not only “piracy” but “Piracies,” suggesting that there are a variety of 
offenses that might qualify as piracy. Contrast this provision, for instance, 
with the Treason Clause, which incorporates a particular definition of 
treason from English law and forbids Congress and the federal courts from 
expanding that definition.139 The Define and Punish Clause seems 
calculated to give Congress maximum discretion over the definition and 
punishment of piracy. 
The additional power to “define and punish” “[f]elonies committed on 
the high Seas” creates something of a puzzle. At common law, a felony was 
defined as a crime punishable by attainder. Only a common law court had 
the authority to impose that punishment, and so only a common law court 
could try a felony. Crimes committed on the high seas were within the 
admiralty jurisdiction, though under the Act of 1536 they were tried “by the 
course of the common law.”140 The Act of 1536 did not make crimes on the 
high seas felonies; rather, it made anything that would be a felony on land a 
crime if committed on the high seas.141 Pirates and others convicted under 
the Act of 1536 were not subject to attainder.142 The power to define and 
punish “felonies committed on the high seas,” therefore, appears to be a 
thoroughly modern, and thoroughly American, locution. In my view, the 
best reading of the clause is that the framers meant to give Congress wide 
latitude to define and punish crime on the high seas without being moored 
to an existing definition, whether under the law of nations, the common 
law, or another nation’s statute law.143 
 
The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 150, 159 
(2009) (“The Define and Punish Clause was among the least controversial in the Constitution.”); see 
also ST. GEORGE TUCKER, supra note 126, at 163. 
 138 See CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, DE DOMINIO MARIS DISSERTATIO 44 (Ralph Van Deman 
Magoffin trans., Oxford University Press 2d ed. 1744) (listing the offenses considered piracy in the 
Netherlands); 2 WOODDESON, supra note 73, at 431–35 (discussing the English law of piracy). 
 139 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War 
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.” (emphasis added)). See 
generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES, at ch. 4 (1945) 
(explaining how the framers crafted Article III’s definition of treason based on English law). 
 140 28 Hen. 8 c. 15 (1536). 
 141 See HALE, supra note 85, at 77. 
 142 Id. 
 143 But see Kontorovich, supra note 137, at 167. Professor Eugene Kontorovich argues that the 
Define and Punish Clause’s enumeration of “piracies” and “other felonies on the high seas” separately 
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As discussed briefly above, the Constitution allocates other powers to 
Congress, the Executive, and the courts that pertain to the exercise of 
authority abroad. The framing and ratification debates reveal little about 
how Americans understood their application to conduct abroad. 
Accordingly, this Article considers them in turn as they are relevant to 
understanding the early practice and as that practice reflects the founding 
generation’s understanding of their extraterritorial application. 
C.   Due Process of Law 
The Constitution provided for a government of limited powers, and it 
divided and limited those powers in ways that would have been understood 
to overlap with the requirement of due process of law.144 But the 
Constitution’s opponents were still skeptical of vesting such power in a 
centralized government without placing further restrictions on it.145 To 
satisfy them, at James Madison’s insistence, the First Congress enacted and 
the states ratified the Bill of Rights.146 
Tucked into the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause provides 
that “no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”147 On its face, the provision applies to any 
governmental deprivation of life, liberty, or property, by any government 
agent, against any one and anywhere.148 
Evaluating the application of due process abroad during the early 
years of the republic requires first approximating the founding generation’s 
understanding of due process of law. It was in some ways quite different 
from the due process doctrines that the Supreme Court has articulated in 
the modern era. 
 
may be read to incorporate the law of nations distinction between piracy as a universal crime and 
felonies as a municipal crime requiring a nexus to the proscribing sovereign. I disagree. While the 
Framers understood that every nation had a right and duty to punish piracy, they also understood that 
every nation had done so uniquely according to its own municipal law. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
16, at *71–72 (discussing the English law of piracy); VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 138, at 44 (listing 
the offenses considered piracy by the Netherlands). 
 144 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1717–20. 
 145 See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION 51 (2010); JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 143 
(1996). 
 146 See MAIER, supra note 145, at 446–52. 
 147 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 148 See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 36, at 257 nn.160−61 (citing to scholars who acknowledge that the 
clause’s text appears to provide for global and universal protection). 
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Scholars agree that through the Antebellum Era “due process of law” 
had a core meaning.149 Due process prohibited the government from 
depriving persons of “life, liberty, or property” without the application of 
standing law by a court proceeding according to the appropriate 
procedures.150 Moreover, as the Court put it in one of the earliest cases 
arising under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, due 
process guaranteed “[t]he enforcement of [constitutional] limitations by 
judicial process.”151 Federal and state courts routinely articulated this 
understanding and applied a range of constitutional provisions that were 
either synonymous with or overlapped due process of law.152 
For the purposes of this Article, scholarly disputes about whether the 
framers understood “due process of law” to place limits on the legislature’s 
ability to regulate certain forms of private conduct—today’s “substantive 
due process”—are beside the point.153 All agree that, at a minimum, due 
process was understood to require what Chancellor James Kent called “law 
in its regular course of administration through courts of justice”154 and what 
 
 149 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1676 n.5 (collecting sources that discuss the core 
meaning of due process as a prohibition on unlawful deprivations of rights). But see id. at n.6 
(collecting sources that argue that due process also entailed “substantive” or natural rights). 
 150 Id. at 1729 nn.245−46, 1733 n.274 (collecting cases). 
 151 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536 (1884) (noting further that judicial enforcement “is the 
device of self-governing communities to protect the rights of individuals and minorities, as well against 
the power of numbers, as against the violence of public agents transcending the limits of lawful 
authority, even when acting in the name and wielding the force of the government”); see also 1 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 16 at *141–42 (discussing the relationship between English legal protections 
against unlawful deprivations of life, liberty, or property and the “third subordinate right of every 
Englishman [which] is that of applying to the courts of justice for redress of injuries”). 
 152 See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 536; Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 
(18 How.) 272, 276 (1855); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 553 (1852); Chapman & McConnell, 
supra note 19, at 1714–16 (discussing Hamilton’s use of “due Process of law” in the New York 
legislature); id. at 1727–29 (analyzing antebellum state cases); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only 
Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 429 (2010) (noting that “law of the land” was 
understood to be synonymous with “due process of law”); see also COKE, supra note 93, at 50. 
 153 Compare, e.g., CHESTER ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 351–55 (1997) (citing antebellum cases protecting natural rights), Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law 
Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585 (2009) (arguing that “law” in “due 
process of law” was understood to refer to an act that complies with natural law), and Williams, supra 
note 152, at 411–12 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment, but not the Fifth Amendment, was 
understood to include “substantive” due process rights), with Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 
1672 (arguing that due process applied against the legislature, but not as a species of “substantive” due 
process). 
 154 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 16 (John M. Gould ed., Boston, Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1896). 
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Justice Swayne called “the application of law as it exists in the fair and 
regular course of administrative procedure.”155 
As the next Part illustrates, it was this notion of due process that 
applied to the deprivation of rights arising from federal law enforcement 
abroad. Due process required the ordinary constitutional, statutory, and 
common law criminal procedures before the punishment of any suspect 
captured outside U.S. territory; the ordinary statutory and law of nations 
procedures before the deprivation of property for a violation of U.S. law on 
the high seas; and the right to sue a federal officer for the unauthorized 
deprivation of rights committed outside U.S. territory. Indeed, many 
captures on the high seas could give rise to all three forms of action at law; 
together they could be summed up as due process of law. 
IV.  AN OVERVIEW OF EARLY FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING                 
CONDUCT ABROAD 
The following three Parts of this Article turn to early practice. 
Together they show that early Americans apparently understood that all 
persons suspected of violating federal law were entitled to due process of 
law. The federal government could not deprive them of rights, except 
according to the structural and procedural conditions required by federal 
law. This applied to aliens and citizens alike, regardless of where federal 
officers captured them. 
This Part begins by providing an overview of the early federal law 
governing private conduct abroad. The next Part focuses on criminal 
punishment for conduct abroad and distinguishes it from war. The 
following Part turns to civil condemnation and trespass suits against 
officers arising from captures on the high seas. 
A.   The Conduct Regulated 
From the beginning, the federal government regulated a wide range of 
conduct on the high seas. Over time it exercised more authority to reach 
foreigners and conduct in foreign territory related to conduct on the high 
seas, especially the capture of slaves on foreign shores. Congress enacted 
 
 155 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 127 (1873) (Swayne, J., dissenting); see also 
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.) (“It is the peculiar province of the 
legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to 
individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments.”); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
16, at *44 (explaining that law is “not a transient sudden order . . . to or concerning a particular person; 
but something permanent, uniform, and universal”); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 
284 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1988) (1690); Chapman & McConnell, 
supra note 19, at 1733 n.274 (collecting cases); id. at 1729 nn.245–46 (same). 
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the Crimes Act of 1790, the first federal criminal provision, before the 
states had ratified the Bill of Rights.156 Five of the Act’s thirty-three 
sections prohibit piracy and other felonies on the high seas.157 The broadest 
provision applied to “any person or persons” who commits “murder or 
robbery, or any other offence which if committed within the body of a 
county, would by the laws of the United States be punishable with death”; 
to “any captain or mariner” who “shall piratically and feloniously run away 
with [a] ship or vessel,” “or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any 
pirate”; and to “any seaman” who “shall lay violent hands upon his 
commander” “or shall make a revolt in the ship.”158 The provision applied 
to conduct “upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of 
the jurisdiction of any particular state.”159 
The Crimes Act of 1790 was only the beginning. Congress continued 
to enact laws prohibiting conduct outside U.S. territory. Many of them, 
especially Non-Intercourse Acts and Embargoes, responded to diplomatic 
and commercial changes arising from wars between European powers 
(especially between Britain and France) or between a European power and 
its American colonies. Others simply extended the federal government’s 
control over particular practices that were unlawful during war and peace 
alike, such as piracy or the slave trade. 
Early extraterritorial federal regulations fell into several categories. 
The first was piracy and other felonies on the high seas. This included 
conduct that would have been a felony, or at least a serious crime, under 
the common law had it been committed on land: theft, assault, arson, and 
the like. Throughout this period Congress broadened the definition of 
piracy and felonies on the high seas, reaching more conduct committed by 
more persons.160 The Supreme Court agreed that Congress could extend 
piracy beyond its traditional bounds with a statute clearly intended to do 
so.161 
 
 156 See Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112. 
 157 See id. §§ 8–13. 
 158 Id. § 8. 
 159 Id. Congress later discussed whether it had the authority to prohibit piracy in the Chesapeake 
but seemed to conclude that Virginia and Maryland likely had joint jurisdiction over the Chesapeake 
and indefinitely tabled the issue. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 1007–09 (1807); 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 2279 
(1808). 
 160 See Crimes Act of 1825, ch. 65, 4 Stat.115; Piracy Act of 1820, ch. 113, 3 Stat. 600; Piracy Act 
of 1819, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 510. 
 161 See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818) (“The constitution having 
conferred on congress the power of defining and punishing piracy, there can be no doubt of the right of 
the legislature to enact laws punishing pirates, although they may be foreigners, and may have 
committed no particular offence against the United States.”); id. at 630 (concluding that Section 8 of the 
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The second category of regulations comprised prohibitions on the 
slave trade. The earliest law against the slave trade, enacted in 1794,162 
provided for civil forfeiture. In 1800, Congress authorized the criminal 
punishment of any U.S. citizen who served on a U.S. vessel “employed or 
made use of in the transportation or carrying of slaves from one foreign 
country or place to another.”163 The Act of 1808 extended the civil 
forfeiture provisions and authorized criminal punishment for buying a slave 
imported from a foreign shore.164 The Slave Trade Act of 1818 extended 
this criminal jurisdiction and made it clear that it was subject to due process 
of law. Section 4 provided that any U.S. citizen or resident who “shall take 
on board, receive, or transport from any of the coasts or kingdoms of 
Africa, or from any other foreign place, or country, or from the sea” anyone 
“in any ship, vessel, boat, or other water craft for the purpose” of selling 
them as a slave shall be subject not only to forfeiture of money and ship but 
imprisonment “on conviction, by due course of law.”165 
The Piracy Act of 1820 expanded the definition of piracy to include 
“robbery” committed “on shore” by the crew of a pirate vessel.166 The Act 
also extended the definition of piracy, and the specter of capital 
punishment, to those engaged in the slave trade.167 Both of these provisions 
extended U.S. municipal criminal law beyond the definition of piracy under 
 
1790 Crimes Act extended to murder, robbery, or any other offence, which committed within a county, 
would be punishable with death). 
 162 The Constitution forbade Congress to prohibit the slave trade before 1808. U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 1. Congress could, though, discourage the slave trade by taxing it. The First Congress debated a 
$10 per capita duty on slaves, shelved the proposal, and never returned to it. 
 163 Slave Trade Act of 1800, ch. 51, §4, 2 Stat. 70; see W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE 
AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1638–1870, at 80–84 (1896). 
 164 Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves, ch. 22, § 2, 2 Stat 426, 426 (1807) (owners and 
masters forfeit the ship); id. § 3 (aiders and abettors forfeit $20,000). The law went into effect on 
January 1, 1808. Great Britain enacted a similar law after the Act of 1808 that went into effect before it. 
See An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 47 Geo. III Sess. 1 c. 36. See generally PAUL 
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS 133 (3d ed. 2014); Matthew E. Mason, Slavery 
Overshadowed, 20 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 59 (2000) (explaining that the congressional debates, which 
foreshadowed the sectionalism that would fully emerge later in the century, were overshadowed by 
concern about Burr’s alleged rebellion in the southwest and the Napoleonic wars in Europe). See also 
The Josefa Segunda, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 312 (1825); United States v. Preston, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 57 
(1830). 
 165 Slave Trade Act of 1818, ch. 91, § 4, 3 Stat. 450, 451 (emphasis added); see also id. §§ 3, 6 
(likewise specifying the requirement that the government follow the “due course of law”); see, e.g., The 
Merino et al., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391, 405 (1824) (applying the Act of 1818 against U.S. citizens who 
“[took] on board” slaves “in one foreign place, for the purpose of their being held to service or labour”). 
 166 Piracy Act of 1820, ch. 113, § 3, 3 Stat. 600, 601. 
 167 Id. § 4; see also A. H. FOOTE, THE AFRICAN SQUADRON 3 (1855) (stating in an address to the 
annual meeting of the board of directors of the American Colonization Society that “the African slave 
trade has been pronounced by the United States piracy only in a municipal sense—not piracy by the law 
of nations”). 
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the common law or the law of nations.168 And both of them expressly 
conditioned criminal punishment upon “conviction . . . before the circuit 
court of the United States for the district into which [the defendant] shall be 
brought, or in which he shall be found.”169 
The third major category of extraterritorial federal crimes involved 
conduct that violated U.S. neutrality or interfered with U.S. foreign trade 
policy. They included: the Neutrality Act of 1794 (made permanent in 
1800);170 the Non-Intercourse Acts enacted during the Quasi-War with 
France from 1798 to 1800;171 the Non-Intercourse Act of 1808 (amended 
twice);172 and the non-intercourse act known as “Macon’s Bill Number 2” 
of 1810 and a supplementary act.173 These statutes often blended wartime or 
diplomatic concerns with the mechanisms of ordinary criminal law 
enforcement: the statutory definition of a crime, the criminal punishment of 
fines and/or imprisonment, the authorization of searches and seizures by 
U.S. warships (either within U.S. territory or on the high seas), and 
adjudication by federal courts pursuant to ordinary criminal procedures. 
The U.S. government actively enforced these laws. American sailors 
understood them well.174 Before 1800, the most frequently indicted federal 
 
 168 See Le Louis, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (1817) (High Ct. Adm.) 1471 (holding that the slave trade 
was not a violation of the law of nations and therefore not punishable as piracy except under the 
vessel’s sovereign’s municipal law); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 118–20 (1825) (also 
holding that the slave trade was not a violation of the law of nations and therefore not punishable as 
piracy except under the vessel’s sovereign’s municipal law). See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE 
ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED AFRICANS IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JAMES 
MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (1977). 
 169 Piracy Act of 1820, ch. 113, §§ 3,4, 3 Stat. 600. 
 170 Neutrality Act of 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381–86. 
 171 Act of Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 7; Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 613; Act of June 28, 
1798, ch. 62, 1 Stat. 574; Act of June 13, 1798, ch. 53, 1 Stat. 565; Act of May 28, 1798 ch. 48, 1 Stat. 
561. See generally HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801−15, at 
408–15 (1981) (discussing illegal smuggling during the “Quasi-War” with France from 1797 to 1800). 
 172 Non-Intercourse Act of 1808, ch. 24, 2 Stat. 528, amended by Act of May 30, 1809, ch. 1, 
2 Stat. 547, and Act of June 28, 1809, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 550. 
 173 Macon’s Bill Number 2, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 605 (1810). I am putting to one side a number of laws 
that criminalized conduct that could be characterized as outside U.S. territory but that, for purposes of 
this Article, are not. The United States provided ordinary due process in these cases too, but because 
they may be characterized as being within U.S. territory, they are less salient for my argument. The first 
include crimes by or against Indians or in Indian territory. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 
(providing for punishment of crimes committed in Indian territory); Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 
139 (establishing penalties for crimes committed in Indian territory). The second include criminal 
conduct within U.S. port or territorial waters in violation of an embargo. See Enforcement Act, ch. 33, 
2 Stat. 473 (1808) (establishing penalties and forfeitures for exporting goods during embargo); 
Embargo Act of 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451 (laying an embargo on shipping in the U.S.). 
 174 AMERICAN SHIP-MASTER’S DAILY ASSISTANT, supra note 64 (including chapters on U.S. slave 
trade laws and piracy law). 
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crime was “assault and battery aboard ship.”175 From 1800 to 1830, 
“[a]dmiralty and [m]aritime” crimes accounted for more than 30% of 
federal indictments.176 In absolute numbers, 406 of the 2,718 indictments 
during this period were for piracy.177 The prosecution and punishment of 
extraterritorial crimes, including crimes committed by aliens, was one of 
the federal government’s top priorities. 
B.   The Enforcement Mechanisms: Criminal Trial and Civil Condemnation 
To regulate the foregoing conduct abroad, the federal government 
principally used two enforcement mechanisms—punishment after criminal 
trial, and civil forfeiture after a condemnation by a federal court sitting in 
admiralty. The Crimes Act of 1790, for instance, provided for criminal 
punishments consisting of fines, incarceration, death, and dissection.178 
Other provisions, especially trade regulations, were enforced only by bonds 
(for which the owner would be liable at common law)179 and civil 
forfeiture.180 Congress passed many of these regulations to enforce the 
nation’s international position during a period of quasi-war. Some 
regulations authorized U.S. warships to capture enemy and friendly vessels 
violating neutrality acts and embargoes.181 U.S. courts handled the 
condemnation proceedings arising from such captures as they would have 
handled a prize case. As Justice Story explained, these captures were not 
“strictly jure belli” because they were not condemnations of the vessels of 
an enemy with whom the United States was formally at war; instead, they 
were “public acts in the nature of captures jure belli.”182 
 
 175 HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 13. 
 176 Id. at 215. 
 177 Id. 
 178 The propriety of dissection as a punishment for those convicted of capital crimes was one of the 
only aspects of the bill debated in the House. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1519 (1790). The penalty was 
only carried out once—against four men arrested in Copenhagen and returned in 1818 to Boston, where 
they were tried, convicted, and executed for murder and piracy. See HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 134. 
 179 See, e.g., Speake v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 28, 35–36 (1815) (Story, J.) (holding that 
a bond for more than double the value of the ship was valid because it was taken voluntarily). 
 180 Enforcement Act of 1809, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 506; Act of Apr. 25, 1808, ch. 66, 2 Stat. 499; Embargo 
Act of 1808, ch. 33, 2 Stat. 473; Act of Jan. 9, 1808, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 453; Embargo Act of 1807, ch. 5, 
2 Stat. 451; Second Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 613 (1799); First Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 53, 
1 Stat. 565 (1798); Act of June 28, 1798, ch. 62, 1 Stat. 574 (providing for distribution of prize awards); 
Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 48, 1 Stat. 561 (non-intercourse act); see also Slave Trade Act of 1794, ch. 11, 
§§ 1–2, 1 Stat. 347, 349 (requiring forfeiture for violation of the Act). 
 181 See, e.g., Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves, ch. 22, § 7, 2 Stat. 426, 428 (1807) 
(authorizing capture of US slave traders on the high seas); Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 86, 1 Stat. 578 
(authorizing capture and condemnation of any armed French vessel). 
 182 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 11 (1827) (Story, J.) (emphasis added). 
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Some statutes, however, regulated the same conduct with both 
mechanisms of enforcement.183 Although arising from the same conduct 
abroad and the same capture, a criminal prosecution and related civil 
condemnation suit would proceed entirely independently of one another.184 
The criminal prosecution was in personam and usually arose under the 
exclusive original jurisdiction of a federal circuit court that proceeded 
according to the course of the common law.185 Condemnation proceedings, 
by contrast, were in rem and arose under the admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction of a district court that proceeded “according to the course of the 
civil law.”186 In the civil suit, the owners of the captured vessel could 
countersue the capturing officer for maritime trespass, i.e., for exceeding 
his authority under congressional act, executive order, and the law of 
nations.187 
Americans appeared to believe that both enforcement mechanisms 
were consistent with due process of law. The Piracy Act of 1819, for 
instance, made it a crime for “any person or persons whatsoever” to 
“commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations” and 
authorized capital punishment “upon conviction thereof, before the circuit 
court of the United States for the district into which he or they may be 
brought.”188 The Act also made vessels “from which any piratical 
aggression . . . shall have been first attempted or made” subject to 
condemnation “after due process and trial, in any court having admiralty 
jurisdiction . . . .”189 The process that was due, in other words, depended on 
the case. Criminal prosecutions proceeding in personam had to be 
 
 183 See, e.g., Piracy Act of 1819, ch. 77, §§ 2–5, 3 Stat. 510, 512–14 (permitting seizure of any 
vessel or boat that committed or attempted to commit “piratical aggression,” and permitting the 
infliction of punishment on any person convicted of piracy after trial in a United States district court). 
 184 Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 15 (“[T]he practice has been, and so this Court understand the law to be, 
that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in 
personam.”). 
 185 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (giving circuit courts general jurisdiction over 
federal crimes); see also id. § 9 (giving district courts jurisdiction over crimes with relatively minor 
punishments). 
 186 Id. § 9 (conferring “exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction” on district courts); The Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94 (providing that 
federal courts sitting in admiralty shall proceed according to the civil law); Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794) (interpreting this jurisdiction to include “all the powers of a court of 
Admiralty, whether considered as an instance, or as a prize court”). 
 187 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 
(1800). 
 188 Piracy Act of 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14, amended by Piracy Act of 1820, ch. 113, 
3 Stat. 600 (extending section 5 indefinitely); see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 
(1820) (holding that the provision was reasonably certain). 
 189 Piracy Act of 1819, ch. 77, § 4, 3 Stat. 510, 513 (emphasis added). 
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according to the common law; civil forfeiture suits in rem had to be 
according to the civil law. Both forms of proceeding were understood to 
amount to “due process and trial.”190 
A well-known case illustrates these enforcement mechanisms.191 Off 
the shore of Africa, The U.S.S. Alligator approached a vessel that appeared 
to be in distress.192 After the Alligator showed the U.S. flag, the other vessel 
opened fire.193 The two exchanged fire until the other vessel allowed the 
U.S. captain to board and inspect her papers.194 The papers showed the 
vessel to be a Portuguese merchant, The Marianna Flora; the ship’s captain 
said that she fired on the U.S. ship believing her to be a pirate.195 The U.S. 
captain was unsatisfied; the ship had acted like a decoy, papers are easy to 
falsify, and there was no reason (other than general distrust) for the 
Marianna Flora to have suspected the Alligator of piracy.196 
A British man-of-war in the same circumstance almost certainly 
would have sailed the vessel to a vice-admiralty court in one of the British 
colonies in Africa.197 Because it was outside of England, that court would 
have tried the Portuguese captain and crew for piracy and entertained a 
condemnation suit.198 The Alligator did not have that option. Nor did it have 
lawful authority to try the Portuguese crew itself. 
Suspecting the vessel of piracy, the U.S. captain put a “prize crew”—a 
detail from his own ship—on the Marianna Flora with instructions to sail 
it to the U.S. for condemnation proceedings.199 The crew put the Portuguese 
crew in irons and sailed to Boston. Upon arrival, the American master 
libeled the Marianna Flora, seeking condemnation and sale of the ship and 
 
 190 See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855) 
(holding that traditional procedures satisfied due process of law even when they were different from the 
ordinary requirements of the common law). 
 191 See generally The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1825); The Marianna Flora, 16 F. 
Cas. 736 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. Oct. 1822). See also The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 
(1827) (Story, J.); HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 130 (discussing the libel of the brig B and the 
concurrent indictment of Thomas Jones before the federal district court in Rhode Island in 1817); 
Circular from Secretary of State Adams to District Attorneys (Microcopy M 40), reel 28, pp. 164–65 
(May 1823) (asking for copies of proceedings “in cases of Foreign Vessels brought on suit into Port 
upon charges of Piracy, aggression upon vessels of the United States; or relating to the slave trade; and 
in cases of process against or trial of individual Foreigners for those offenses”). 
 192 The Marianna Flora, 16 F. Cas. at 736. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. at 7–8 (Blake, arguing for the respondents). 
 197 See supra Section II.C. 
 198 Id. 
 199 The Marianna Flora, 16 F. Cas. at 736. 
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cargo and distribution of the proceeds.200 The owner counterclaimed for 
damages, arguing that the captain of the Alligator had lacked probable 
cause to seize the vessel in the first place, much less to sail it from Africa to 
the United States for proceedings.201 Ultimately the Supreme Court 
concluded that the captain, though proven wrong, was justified in capturing 
and detaining the vessel because of its unusual maneuvers and its firefight 
with the U.S. vessel.202 The capture and suits appeared to arise from an 
unfortunate (and expensive) misunderstanding, and since it was a case of 
first impression, the Court decided to let both sides go without further 
costs.203 
The case illustrates several points. First, the potential for maritime 
misunderstandings which could precipitate international conflict provided a 
powerful motivation for subjecting disputes about rights and duties on the 
high seas to an independent tribunal that could carefully weigh the 
evidence. These dangers were exacerbated on the high seas, where 
subterfuge was commonplace.204 The law of nations had long provided 
rules that all of the western powers recognized.205 The United States 
followed these rules but implemented and supplemented them through its 
unique municipal law—through captures authorized by Congress and 
legitimized by an Article III court with jurisdiction over both piracy and 
prize cases.206 
Second, though a capture on the high seas could give rise to several 
different legal remedies, all of them were supplied by federal courts. This 
approach was inconvenient and expensive. By design, the courts lacked the 
authority to respond to changing concerns about the nation’s foreign 
affairs; instead, they were obligated to review captures on the high seas for 
compliance with the law of nations and U.S. law. In doing so, they 
extended due process to all who came within the United States’ law 
enforcement jurisdiction. 
 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 11–12 (1825). 
 203 Id. at 58. 
 204 See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 126 (1825) (“Whether the General Ramirez, 
originally the Antelope, is to be considered as the prize of a commissioned belligerent ship of war 
unlawfully equipped in the United States, or as a pirate, it seems proper to make some inquiry into the 
title of the claimants.” (emphasis added)). 
 205 See Condemnation of Prize, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 78, 79 (1797) (“[T]he rule [arising from the law 
of nations] before mentioned is designed to prevent piracy and other unjust seizures on the high seas, 
which it is in the interest of all nations to prevent.”). 
 206 See, e.g., Prize Ship and Crew, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 85, 85 (1798). 
112:377 (2017) Due Process Abroad 
413 
V.   THE EVIDENCE FOR DUE PROCESS ABROAD 
The previous Part provided an overview of early federal criminal law 
enforcement abroad. This Part more carefully explores evidence showing 
that all three departments of the federal government understood due 
process to be a limit on federal law enforcement outside U.S. territory. 
First, Congress and the courts believed that due process limited Congress’s 
power to authorize punishment for crimes committed on the high seas. 
Even before the ratification of the Bill of Rights, Congress placed due 
process limits on federal criminal punishment.207 After the ratification of 
the Bill of Rights, Justice Iredell acknowledged that the Constitution’s 
express limits on congressional power—including the Bill of Rights’ 
criminal procedural protections—limited Congress’s power to “define and 
punish” piracy.208 Second, the Executive Department uniformly complied 
with due process in the enforcement of U.S. law abroad. The most potent 
evidence of this commitment came during a period of sustained law 
enforcement against pirates in Puerto Rico and Cuba.209 The United States 
consistently supplied due process for foreign pirates who menaced U.S. 
merchant vessels, even when doing so was extraordinarily costly. Congress 
considered giving the President authority to try and punish pirates on the 
spot but declined to do so for reasons that sounded in due process of law 
(though Congress did not expressly cite the Fifth Amendment).210 The 
piracy scourge ended only when the Spanish coerced confessions and 
executed dozens of pirates captured in a joint operation with the U.S. 
Navy.211 Moreover, U.S. officials consistently distinguished between the 
federal government’s power to operate against criminals and its power 
against foreigners who claimed sovereign status and threatened the United 
States with war. Finally, U.S. courts routinely heard suits against U.S. 
officers for exceeding their authority to capture a foreign vessel on the high 
seas.212 Such suits mirrored common law trespass suits that many scholars 
believe to have been a mechanism for enforcing constitutional rights. 
A.   Congress’s Power to Authorize Punishment for Conduct Abroad 
Congress and the courts believed that Congress could not authorize 
punishment for conduct abroad without due process of law. The best 
evidence of Congress’s constitutional understanding are the terms of the 
 
 207 See infra Section V.A. 
 208 See infra Section V.A. 
 209 See infra Section V.B.1. 
 210 See infra Section V.B.1. 
 211 See infra Section V.B.1. 
 212 See infra Section V.B.3. 
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statutes themselves. The statutes that defined extraterritorial federal crimes 
stipulated that punishment would follow conviction in a federal court. This 
requirement began with the Crimes Act of 1790. The Act provides that 
those “adjudged” and “convicted” of being a pirate and a felon “shall suffer 
death,” stipulating that the trial for pirates “shall be in the district where the 
offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought.”213 The Act 
made no exceptions for noncitizen defendants. Subsequent statutes 
followed suit, whether they authorized punishment following a criminal 
trial or civil forfeiture following a condemnation proceeding.214 
Conditioning punishment on conviction in a court in a district into 
which the defendant “may first be brought” provides crucial insight into the 
statute’s extraterritorial reach. The statute supposes that some pirates would 
be captured outside the jurisdiction of a federal court. But it nevertheless 
conditions punishment of such a suspect on conviction in a federal court. 
There is no plausible way to read the provision as authorizing the President 
to punish pirates upon capture on the high seas. The statute required trial in 
a federal court. Any executive power to punish pirates or other criminals 
captured outside the United States would have to come directly from the 
Constitution.215 As the remainder of this Part demonstrates, the President 
never argued that the Constitution gave him power to punish criminal 
suspects captured outside U.S. territory absent congressional authority. 
Rather, the President understood the Executive’s authority to execute the 
law abroad was subject to the terms of that law.216 Additionally, federal 
courts enforced congressional limits on executive law enforcement 
abroad.217 
Why did Congress expressly condition criminal punishment on 
conviction in an Article III court? Did Congress believe that the 
Constitution did not require conviction in a federal court before criminal 
punishment? The most obvious answer, I believe, is that Congress assumed 
judgment to be constitutionally required before punishment, and stipulated 
conviction, condemnation, or some other form of judgment to clarify the 
 
 213 Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–114. 
 214 See, e.g., Piracy Act of 1819, ch 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–514; Slave Trade Act of 1818, ch. 91, 
§ 4, 3 Stat. 450, 451–52; Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves, ch. 22, § 7, 2 Stat. 426, 428 (1807). 
 215 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (vesting “the executive power” in the President). 
 216 See, e.g., Prosecutions for Piracy, 1815, 1 Op. Att’y. Gen. 185, 186 (1815) (directing district 
attorney to prosecute piracy committed outside the jurisdiction of any particular state in the district 
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applicable rules of procedure. For the Crimes Act of 1700, in particular, 
there are especially good reasons to suspect that Congress specified 
punishment upon conviction of pirates for clarity rather than because they 
believed the issue to be a matter of discretion. Requiring federal courts to 
try pirates according to the course of the common law was a departure from 
recent British practice in the colonies.218 The Crimes Act of 1790 simply 
returned to the procedural protections of the statute of Henry VIII that had 
been enforced in England since 1536.219 The Act was drafted alongside the 
Bill of Rights and went into effect before the states ratified the Bill of 
Rights. The other provisions of the Crimes Act that applied to conduct 
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts likewise specify that 
punishment must follow conviction.220 It seems unlikely that Congress 
would have thought the Bill of Rights, once ratified, would not apply to 
prosecutions under the Act. 
In many respects, the constitutional Framers had determined this 
course of action before Congress ever convened or considered the Bill of 
Rights. Article III of the Constitution vested admiralty jurisdiction in the 
federal courts and required those courts to try all crimes by a jury.221 Even 
if Congress had wanted to authorize punishment for piracy without the 
ordinary protections of a common law trial (which was unlikely given the 
nation’s antipathy to vice-admiralty courts), the Constitution gave it little 
choice but to require that punishment for piracy and other felonies on the 
high seas must follow conviction in an Article III court. Adding the 
requirement of “due process of law” in the Fifth Amendment simply 
guaranteed that courts would enforce these restrictions (and others) in 
individual cases. 
Justice Iredell articulated this understanding of congressional power 
when he charged one of the earliest federal grand juries to consider piracy 
charges. In a style typical of the day, Iredell at once elaborated on grand 
themes of constitutional principle while admonishing the jurors to do their 
civic duty.222 He proposed to systematically explain the Constitution’s 
“restrictions on the criminal law.”223 He began with what are now 
commonly understood as structural restrictions: the Suspension Clause, the 
Ex Post Facto Clause, the Bill of Attainder Clause, and the jury trial rights 
 
 218 See supra Section II.C. 
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of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.224 Iredell explained that 
these provisions were “calculated to secure . . . the invaluable possession of 
personal liberty, so that it may not be unjustly sacrificed to any arbitrary 
measures.”225 His instruction was a mini-treatise on the separation of 
powers principles that early American courts often enforced as a 
requirement of due process of law.226 
Only after articulating all of these constitutional limits on the 
government’s power to punish crimes in general did Iredell arrive at “the 
authority of the Legislature” to “define and punish” crimes on the high 
seas.227 Apparently Iredell believed the Constitution’s limits on Congress’s 
power to punish crimes applied with full force to crimes, such as piracy, 
committed on the high seas. Under his reasoning, it also applied with full 
force to any governmental action meant to punish criminal conduct, 
whether that conduct was within the jurisdiction of a federal court or not. 
Rather, his reasoning extended the early understanding of due process to 
any federal criminal punishment, at home or abroad.  
B.   Executive Practice 
Members of the Executive Department apparently believed that they 
lacked authority to deprive criminal suspects of rights without a trial in an 
Article III court. The most powerful evidence of this comes from the 
federal government’s efforts to quell piracy in Cuba and Puerto Rico from 
1815 to 1825.228 The government’s commitment to jury trial in the United 
States despite its inefficiency, especially compared to how other nations 
dealt with pirates, strongly suggests that Americans believed the 
Constitution limited the government’s authority to punish them without due 
process. During the same period, the Monroe Administration declined to 
enter into a treaty with Great Britain that would have subjected U.S. sailors 
to a mixed tribunal of British and American judges upon suspicion of 
engaging in the slave trade, on the ground that the tribunals would not 
comply with Article III.229 While U.S. officers on the high seas of course 
used force against those resisting arrest,230 they never punished pirates or 
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other suspects captured on the high seas without a conviction in a federal 
court. In contrast, during this period, the U.S. military engaged in several 
forays in Florida that deprived persons of rights without trial.231 The 
difference was that the government considered them to be enemies, not 
criminals. 
1.   The End of the Pirates of the Caribbean 
After the War of 1812, Americans got on with business—including 
privateering for Spanish American colonies in revolt against Spain. 
Beginning in 1815, agents of those colonies issued commissions to as many 
as seventy sailors operating mostly out of New Orleans and Baltimore.232 
Accepting such commissions or fitting out a privateer to cruise against a 
neutral nation, such as Spain, violated U.S. neutrality laws.233 The U.S. 
government tried to enforce these laws in federal court, but convictions 
were hard to come by.234 A number of privateers used their licenses to prey 
on Spanish (and other) ships and gained the affection of the local populace 
by smuggling cargo onto the mainland and selling it at a discount.235 Others 
successfully argued to juries that the practice of accepting commissions 
from Spanish colonies was so open and notorious that “it was inferred that 
the government purposedly connived at it.”236 Still others may have relied 
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on popular support for the revolutionaries and the view that “[h]owever 
irregular may have been their proceedings, it is believed they were not of 
sufficient enormity to deserve the dreadful punishment of Death.”237 
By the late 1810s, however, the situation had changed. The Spanish-
American civil wars had subsided. Privateers responded to the market 
change by freelancing. Increasingly, they targeted American merchant 
vessels. All branches of the government responded accordingly, with the 
result that the Executive had maximum authority to address the growing 
crisis. As the nation’s extraterritorial criminal law enforcement expanded, 
due process kept pace. 
Beginning in 1818, the Executive brought a “dramatically” higher 
number of cases to trial,238 and juries began to convict.239 At the same time, 
Congress expanded the definition of piracy well beyond what it had been at 
common law or under the Crimes Act of 1790. In 1818, the Supreme Court 
interpreted “piracy” under the Crimes Act of 1790 to exclude an act by a 
foreigner against a foreigner on a foreign vessel.240 Chief Justice Marshall 
noted that Congress could authorize punishment of such offenders but 
stated that the Court was reluctant to recognize this authorization without a 
clearer statement of Congress’s intent to do so.241 Congress responded in 
1819 by authorizing the punishment of anyone who committed piracy “as 
defined by the law of nations” and authorizing U.S. warships and merchant 
vessels acting in defense to capture them.242 Within a year, the Supreme 
Court clarified that its prior holding limiting the scope of piracy under the 
Act of 1790 did not apply to offenses committed by a foreigner on board a 
vessel “possessed and held by pirates, or persons not lawfully sailing under 
the flag of any foreign nation.”243 Furthermore, the Court also upheld the 
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“law of nations” provision under the Act of 1819 as a proper exercise of 
Congress’s “define and punish” power.244 In 1820, Congress indefinitely 
extended the “law of nations” provision,245 further expanded the definition 
of piracy under U.S. law to clearly reach anyone who commits robbery on 
any vessel,246 and broadened the definition of piracy under U.S. law to any 
U.S. citizen engaged in the international slave trade.247 This expansion of 
U.S. criminal law never outran due process—even as applied to the law 
enforcement operations of the U.S. military on the high seas, foreign 
waters, and foreign soil. 
By the early 1820s, the pirates grew bolder. Tales of pirate 
depredations against U.S. merchant and war vessels multiplied.248 The 
Cuban and Puerto Rican pirates grew increasingly ruthless and violent, 
allegedly dispatching whole crews of American merchantmen, apparently 
to avoid having to transfer them to a place of safety.249 The pirates would 
retreat to sparsely populated coasts of Cuba when given chase.250 Their 
bases were on land, up rivers and inlets that larger war vessels could not 
navigate, well within Spanish territory.251 
In 1822, after repeated stories of violence had turned U.S. sentiment 
against the pirates of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the House Committee on 
Naval Affairs considered whether Congress should authorize the Navy to 
punish pirates upon capture. The Committee had been asked whether (1) it 
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would be expedient “to authorize the destruction of persons and vessels 
found at sea, or in uninhabited places, making war upon the commerce of 
the United States without any regular commission” and (2) whether “it 
would be inconsistent with public law or general usage to give any 
authority to destroy pirates and piratical vessels found at sea or in 
uninhabited places.”252 The second question is ambiguous. While “general 
usage” almost certainly referred exclusively to the practices of other 
nations, “public law” could have been understood to refer more broadly to 
any public law, whether treaty, statute, or Constitution.253 It is unclear 
where the request originated, but it may well have been the Executive 
Department. The request certainly reflects the President’s goal to do 
everything possible to end piracy against American vessels. At the same 
time, though, the second request reflects a sensitivity to the legal 
parameters of doing so. 
The Committee rejected the proposal. Its legal reasons were likewise 
at a very high level of abstraction. 
The committee are of [the] opinion that it would be dangerous, and productive 
of great evil, to vest in the commanders of our public vessels an authority to 
treat as pirates, and punish without trial, even such persons as above described 
[murderous pirates off the coasts of Cuba and Puerto Rico]. It is not necessary 
for the accomplishment of the object in view that such an authority should be 
given, and it is essentially due to the rights of all, and the principles of ‘public 
law and general usage,’ that the consequences and punishment of piracy 
should follow only a legal adjudication of the fact.254 
The Committee did not cite the U.S. Constitution. Given its 
ambiguous mandate, perhaps this is unsurprising. But the Committee’s 
reasoning seemed far more consistent with the notion that pirates were 
entitled to due process of law, rather than simply to the protections of the 
law of nations. It is doubtful that the law of nations required “that the 
consequences and punishment . . . of piracy should follow only a legal 
adjudication of fact,”255 and it certainly did not require a grand jury 
indictment and jury trial.256 This sounds much more like Blackstone’s view 
that pirates were entitled to the “common law of the land,” incorporated 
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into U.S. practice, than to Cicero’s well-known rhetorical trope that pirates 
were the enemies of all mankind.257 In any case, the U.S. Navy would 
continue to enforce the laws against piracy according to due process of law. 
The instructions of Smith Thompson, Secretary of Navy, to 
Commodore Porter, the officer in command of the West Indies Squadron, 
are illustrative. Thompson authorized Porter to pursue pirates into the 
settled areas of Cuba “[to] aid[] the local authorities or people” in 
apprehending the suspects.258 Porter was authorized to pursue suspects “into 
the unsettled parts of the islands or foreign territory” only with the tacit 
permission of the local authority.259 Upon capture, Thompson instructed 
Porter to “deliver them over to the proper authority, to be dealt with 
according to law” and to “furnish such evidence as shall be in [his] power 
to prove the offense alleged against them.”260 In the event that the local 
authorities declined to prosecute, Porter was not authorized to try or punish 
the suspects himself but rather must “keep them safely and securely on 
board some of the vessels under your command and report without 
delay . . . the particular circumstances of such cases” to the Department of 
the Navy.261 In such a case, the government would decide whether to 
prosecute the suspects and whether to hold Spain responsible under the law 
of nations for declining to do so. The orders balanced the U.S. commitment 
to due process of law and respect for Spain’s territorial sovereignty. 
After Congress had declined to authorize the Navy to kill pirates upon 
capture, they grew bolder.262 In response, merchantmen from Maine and 
New York petitioned Congress to purchase the appropriate array of ships 
and adequately fund the Navy to protect their shipping interests.263 
In January of 1825, President Monroe made an appeal for authority to 
pursue the pirates “to the settled as well as the unsettled parts of the 
island,” to engage in reprisals “on the property of the inhabitants,” and to 
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“blockade . . . the ports” of Cuba and Puerto Rico.264 Congress carefully 
debated these measures. On the one hand, the situation for U.S. shipping 
was dire and Spain could not be bothered to take responsibility for the 
depredations committed from its own territory. On the other, placing U.S. 
troops on Spanish soil, authorizing reprisals against Spanish merchants, and 
blockading Spanish ports—though perhaps justified under the law of 
nations—were  steps towards war and they might not have had the intended 
effect of ending piracy.265 
Ultimately Congress authorized the President to enlarge the Navy but 
declined to give him power to engage in warlike measures against Spain.266 
Apparently the congressional debate alone was sufficient to send a message 
to Spain. Before long, Spain sent soldiers to cooperate with the U.S. Navy 
in an operation against one of the pirate strongholds on Puerto Rico.267 
After a firefight, the Americans handed the captives over to the Spanish. 
Within days the Spanish court-martialed, shot, and dismembered the 
pirates, sending their remains to other ports around the island as a 
warning.268 The Spanish approach to discouraging pirates proved extremely 
effective. Piracy in the Caribbean dwindled.269  
The episode invites reflection on what Congress believed to be the 
right of punishment only upon a legal adjudication of fact when it declined 
to authorize U.S. captains to punish pirates on the spot.270 Did Congress 
consider authorizing Navy captains to court-martial pirates? At least in 
theory, it could have done so. Perhaps the difference is that the United 
States considered the pirates in Puerto Rico and Cuba to be criminals, 
whereas the Spanish military considered them to be enemies who were 
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violating the laws of war. In any case, it is clear that the United States, 
when it had opportunity and motive to do so, declined to reduce the 
protections of due process for noncitizens engaged in depredations against 
U.S. interests on the high seas and within foreign waters—even when other 
maritime powers were supplying far less procedural protections for the 
same conduct. The strong implication is that Congress believed it was 
constrained by U.S. law, and the only U.S. law that could constrain 
Congress was the Constitution. The Due Process Clause summarized all of 
the constitutional constraints on Congress’s authority to reduce structural 
and procedural protections for criminal suspects. 
2.   The Monroe Cabinet’s Objections to Mixed Tribunals 
Pirates were not the only criminals abroad protected by due process. 
While the United States was fighting pirates in the Caribbean, it was also 
negotiating a treaty with Britain to suppress the Atlantic slave trade. The 
Monroe Cabinet ultimately declined to sign this treaty because it would 
have subjected Americans suspected of engaging in the slave trade to trial 
by a “mixed tribunal” composed of U.S. and British judges. This would 
have violated the Constitution’s requirement that persons charged with 
federal crimes be tried in a U.S. court. 
Britain had already entered into a number of bilateral treaties 
subjecting the ships of both nations to search and seizure by the other’s 
officers and subjecting those ships to confiscation upon condemnation by 
an ad hoc tribunal composed of judges appointed by both nations.271 For 
Americans, the mutual-search provision was a sticking point; they still 
smarted from British impressment of American sailors during the 
Napoleonic Wars.272 But the Monroe Cabinet also objected to the mixed 
tribunals on a variety of constitutional grounds.273 
In an 1818 Cabinet meeting, Attorney General William Wirt argued 
that the mixed courts would violate a number of constitutional 
 
 271 See Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights Law, 
117 YALE L.J. 550, 552, 576–78 (2008). 
 272 See Martinez, supra note 61, at 1094 (“[V]iewing the full context of the negotiations between 
the British and the Americans, it is clear that the United States’ main objection was to the right of 
maritime search that the treaties conferred on the British government.”). 
 273 Scholars have debated the implications of these objections for the constitutionality of the United 
States’ contemporary involvement with the International Criminal Court (ICC), but they have not 
explored the implication of the evidence for the original reach of due process abroad. See Eugene 
Kontorovich, The Constitutionality of International Courts: The Forgotten Precedent of Slave-Trade 
Tribunals, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 75–81 (2009) (arguing that submitting to the ICC is unconstitutional); 
Martinez, supra note 61, at 1125 (arguing that the Monroe Administration arguments do not foreclose 
the constitutionality of submitting to the ICC). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
424 
protections.274 But Secretary of State John Quincy Adams pointed out that 
the United States already relied on mixed tribunals in some cases. Wirt 
“distinguished the two” by saying that the existing tribunals enforced “the 
law of nations,” whereas the proposed courts would “carry into effect our 
municipal and penal statutes.”275 At the time, the slave trade was not a 
violation of the law of nations. Attorney General Wirt’s position seems to 
have won the day. In 1819, the Cabinet instructed the U.S. negotiator, 
Richard Rush, to reject the mixed tribunals on the ground that the United 
States had no territory abroad that would be convenient for them to hold 
their sessions and on the ground that the judges would not be amenable to 
impeachment.276 
At first Secretary Adams believed that there was no constitutional 
difficulty with the tribunals.277 As the negotiations progressed, he either 
changed his view or decided to go along with the other members of the 
Cabinet. By the fall of 1820, he appears to have been in full agreement with 
them. In a conversation with Stratford Canning, the British diplomat, 
Adams argued that the Fifth Amendment “amounts to an express 
prohibition to subjecting any citizen of the United States to trial before 
such a tribunal.”278 Two months later, in a letter to Canning, he expressed 
concern that under the proposal Americans would be “called to answer for 
any penal offence without the intervention of a grand jury to accuse, and of 
a jury of trial to decide upon the charge.”279 He reiterated the same concern 
in a letter to Canning in 1821.280 Likewise, Albert Gallatin, then Minister to 
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France, wrote to Adams that “we never would agree that the property and, 
above all, the persons of our citizens should, for any presumed violation of 
our own laws, be tried by a foreign or mixed tribunal.”281 Adams, Gallatin, 
and Wirt all made arguments articulating the importance of due process 
abroad for citizens accused of violating U.S. law.282 
The two nations’ diplomats agreed in 1824 to a treaty that provided 
for condemnation proceedings in the owner’s domestic courts—not before 
a mixed tribunal.283 This assuaged the Cabinet members’ constitutional 
concerns about the mixed tribunals.284 It also probably reduced the concern 
about arbitrary British seizures—British captains seizing U.S. vessels could 
be held liable in U.S. federal courts for overstepping their authority.285 To 
the extent, therefore, that the Americans sought to gain some domestic 
oversight of British captains, the plan had worked.286 
Notwithstanding the Executive’s commitment to due process for 
criminal suspects captured on the high seas, there is evidence that in some 
cases U.S. captains destroyed pirate vessels and cargoes on the spot rather 
than taking them in for condemnation.287 To some extent, then, Americans 
treated persons captured on the high seas differently than property. This 
may have been for sheer expediency. It would have been easier, less 
expensive, and less troublesome to a long-term mission to detain a suspect 
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aboard the captor’s vessel than to put a prize crew aboard a suspected pirate 
vessel and sail it to the United States for condemnation proceedings. The 
benefit of doing so would have been especially low when the captured 
vessel and cargo had little value. Nevertheless, destroying the vessel and 
cargo without condemnation would have deprived someone (whether the 
pirate or his victims) of property rights (however meager) without due 
process of law. The fact that these property rights were valued and honored 
under the law of nations is illustrated by the rule that a court that 
condemned pirate property was obligated to hold it notoriously for a year 
before selling it on the open market, so the original owner would have a 
chance to claim it.288 During the Colonial Era, the lords of admiralty knew 
this rule and generally complied with it, but simultaneously instructed their 
warships “to use their best endeavours to take, sink, and burn, or otherwise 
destroy such pirates as may infest [colonial waters].”289 By contrast, the 
Piracy Act of 1819, enacted during the height of the U.S. “war on 
Caribbean piracy,” authorized the President to instruct naval commanders 
“to subdue, take, and send into any port of the United States, any armed 
vessel or boat” when the crew “shall have attempted or committed any 
piratical aggression.”290 That same statute provided that condemnation of 
pirate ships would be by “due process and trial.”291 To the extent American 
vessels departed from such instructions, they acted unlawfully, though 
perhaps in some cases they could claim necessity. 
3.   Distinguishing War 
Some scholars have looked at the early conduct of the U.S. military 
abroad and concluded that due process did not apply extraterritorially.292 
They rely heavily on evidence of the military’s exercise of war power 
rather than ordinary law enforcement. It is easy to confuse the evidence. 
The most thorough scholarly book on the Constitution during war in the 
early Republic treats the Navy’s actions against the pirates of Cuba and 
Puerto Rico alongside the nation’s other military ventures.293 And as 
discussed above, many federal criminal and civil statutes authorized the 
President to enforce them with public warships.294 But Americans 
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consistently distinguished between the constitutional limitations on the 
Navy’s law enforcement powers abroad and the government’s 
constitutional authority to make war. This Section discusses three episodes 
where the government did not supply ordinary due process. On the surface, 
the episodes may seem factually indistinguishable from others where the 
government did supply due process. On closer scrutiny, however, it is clear 
that the government considered the departures from due process to be 
justified by its exercise of war power. 
a.   An Exercise in Line Drawing: Attorney General Lee, 1798 
During the naval war with France, Attorney General Charles Lee sent 
an illuminating memo. In 1798, the U.S.S. Constitution brought the Nigre 
into Norfolk as a prize.295 The ship’s officers and crew included Americans 
and foreigners. Lee carefully instructed Thomas Nelson, District Attorney 
for Virginia, to engage in a “due inquiry”296 to determine whether “the ship 
is regularly commissioned and authorized by France as a public or private 
ship of war.”297 Lee instructed Nelson that if France had commissioned the 
vessel, he was to hold the foreigners as prisoners of war and prosecute the 
Americans for treason or for piracy under the Crimes Act of 1790.298 If the 
ship was operating without sovereign authority, however, Nelson was to 
prosecute them all for piracy in the circuit court “according to the law of 
the United States, without respect to the nation which each individual may 
belong, whether he be British, French, American, or of any other nation.”299 
Lee took special care to instruct Nelson that the trial should proceed 
according to federal rules, not according to Virginia practice, which “is a 
species of trial that gives a chance of acquittal unknown in other states.”300 
Lee reminded Nelson that, while the circuit court was the proper venue for 
trying crimes on the high seas, “proceedings” “against the ship and cargo” 
“are to be had before the district court of the United States in Virginia, 
according to the laws of Congress and the usage and practice of courts of 
admiralty in prize causes.”301 Like any responsible prosecutor, Lee intended 
to give the defendant whatever process was due by law—in this case, the 
Judiciary Act of 1789—not necessarily the process most favorable to the 
defendant. Lee understood that the process due to defendants before the 
government could deprive them of property for conduct on the high seas 
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differed from the process due before the government could deprive them of 
liberty. Altogether the instructions show that Lee knew that the detainees’ 
rights of liberty and property, and the process due before the government 
could deprive them of those rights, depended on whether their conduct 
amounted to war or crime. 
b.   Countering Quasi-Sovereign Groups:                             
Amelia Island, 1816–17 
In 1817, the United States took possession of Amelia Island, just 
southeast of Georgia, and dispersed a band of brigands who had taken it 
from the Spanish.302 From the United States’ standpoint, the enterprise 
amounted to an exercise of war power because it entailed military action 
against a group with political pretensions that had taken territory adjacent 
to the United States by force. 
Formally the island belonged to Spain. Several groups claiming 
authority from Mexico and New Granada—two rebellious Spanish 
colonies—had successively taken the island from Spanish troops.303 They 
used it as a base for privateering and smuggling.304 The leader at the time 
was Louis de Aury, a Frenchman who modestly claimed the title of 
“Captain-General of the Navy of the Independent States of Mexico and 
New Granada, Political and Military Chief of the Island of Amelia, and 
General-in-chief of the sea and Land Forces destined to expel the 
Authorities of the King of Spain from the Provinces of Florida.”305 
President Monroe was concerned about the group’s privateering and 
smuggling into the United States.306 He ordered the Navy to take the 
island—without bloodshed if possible.307 The exercise held little risk for 
U.S. diplomacy. The United States did not think that Aury held a 
commission and had reason to believe that Spain would be glad to be rid of 
the freebooters.308 
Although Aury and his band may not have been technically “enemies” 
under the law of nations, the U.S. capture of the island proceeded like an 
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act of war. The U.S. officers addressed “General Aury” as the 
“Commander-in-chief” and ordered “the forces under [his] command” to 
evacuate the island with “such property as unquestionably belongs to them” 
and to leave behind any public property.309 Aury and his men surrendered 
without a fight but questioned how the U.S. forces could constitutionally 
determine the occupants’ property rights without trial by a tribunal with 
jurisdiction over Amelia Island.310 Potential disputes over the movable 
property on the island did not seem to disturb the U.S. officers. They were 
probably just glad to have the men leave with what little they could carry. 
And leave they did. Despite having been motivated by concerns about law 
enforcement, the United States did not institute prosecutions or “punish” 
any of the men for criminal conduct, and the recapture of the island was, 
strictly speaking, without due process of law.311 
After the fact, Congress considered whether the capture had been 
lawful. A House Select Committee offered two justifications. The first was 
Section 7 of the Slave Trade Act of 1807, which authorized the President to 
use naval forces to curb smuggling.312 The Act was a municipal criminal 
law, and if it had been the sole basis of the Executive’s authority to capture 
Amelia Island, the incident suggests that law enforcement abroad was not 
subject to due process of law. The Select Committee offered an additional 
justification, however, that applied specifically to the capture of Amelia 
Island and that fits better with the other evidence of early law enforcement 
abroad. In 1811, the House and Senate had jointly resolved to authorize the 
President to use the military to take possession of Amelia Island “in the 
event of an attempt to occupy the said territory, or any part thereof, by any 
foreign Government or Power.”313 Congress had thus given the President 
conditional authority to exercise the nation’s war power—by taking 
possession of the island—upon a specific condition precedent. The 
President expressly relied on this congressional resolution to justify the 
capture of Amelia Island to Spain.314 
The only question was whether Aury’s occupation of the island 
satisfied the condition laid out by the resolution. Some scholars have 
suggested that the claim that Aury and his men amounted to a “foreign . . . 
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Power” “within the intendment of Congress” “is difficult to suppose.”315 
While the bandits certainly presented themselves as being aligned with a 
foreign power, the United States did not recognize the validity of their 
commissions from Mexico (and indeed was reluctant to recognize the 
sovereignty of Mexico itself).316 However, the United States could still have 
plausibly believed that the group was a “foreign . . . Power.” The 
resolution’s breadth suggests that Congress had intended to include 
political groups that did not amount to a “Government.” In any case, the 
evidence strongly suggests that Congress and the President understood the 
capture of Amelia Island to be an exercise of war power. As such, it was 
subject to the law of war, not to ordinary due process of law. 
c.   Attacking Enemies: Pensacola, 1817–19 
Between 1817 and 1819, General Andrew Jackson defeated the 
Seminoles in Florida and captured Pensacola and Ft. St. Marks from the 
Spanish.317 Along the way, he captured two British agents suspected of 
fomenting the Seminoles against the Americans, tried them by court-
martial, and, upon conviction, ordered them executed.318 At the time, 
Jackson defended his actions by arguing that the British agents had 
engaged in piracy and therefore did not deserve due process of law. “It is 
an established principle of the law of nations, that any individual of a 
nation, making war against the citizens of another nation, they being at 
peace, forfeits his allegiance, and becomes an outlaw and a pirate.”319 With 
this assertion, Jackson showed how little he knew about the law of nations, 
piracy, and due process; the entire statement was a jumble of mistakes. 
The House of Representatives debated the lawfulness of Jackson’s 
conduct in the context of considering a motion to censure him. His political 
star was on the rise, ensuring that the debates would be shaped by partisan 
interests. Nevertheless, the two official reports out of Congress both 
insisted that the conduct was lawful, if at all, because it was justified under 
the law of war. The House Committee on Military Affairs could “find no 
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law of the United States, authorizing a trial, before a military court, for 
such offences as are alleged against” them with the exception of the charge 
of espionage, of which they were acquitted.320 Neither did “any ‘usage 
authorize,’ or exigency appear from the documents accompanying the 
report of the trial” that would “justify the assumption and exercise of power 
by the court martial, and the commanding General.”321 In other words, 
Congress believed that neither U.S. law nor the laws of war authorized the 
proceedings. In response to Jackson’s assertion that the agents had been 
guilty of “piracy,” the Committee asked “by what system of interpretation 
the offences charged could be considered as piracies, which imply, in 
common acceptation, offences upon the high seas, of which the court could 
not assume cognizance.”322 Of course the only courts that could exercise 
jurisdiction over piracy were the federal courts. The Committee 
“disapprove[d] the proceedings.”323 
The Committee also produced a minority report.324 The minority report 
did not even try to justify the court-martial as a proper court for the trial of 
piracy. Rather, the report argued that Jackson’s whole expedition into 
Florida was justified under the law of nations and that the trial and 
executions were justified as exemplary retaliation against those who, aiding 
and abetting “the savages,” “excit[ed] them to the war” against the United 
States.325 
Ultimately the House declined to formally censure Jackson. Although 
Congress had not authorized the venture, a majority of the House 
apparently concluded that the President had the constitutional authority to 
do so on the ground that the expedition was a defensive maneuver.326 
However, the debate among the members of the House Committee on 
Military Affairs about the legality of the court-martial is telling. 
Punishment for piracy could only follow conviction in a court with 
jurisdiction over the crime. Therefore, any constitutional authority the 
President may have to try and execute prisoners must arise from a lawful 
exercise of war powers.327 
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C.   Suits Against U.S. Officers 
The right of those captured unlawfully abroad to sue the captor in 
federal court reinforces the notion that due process extended wherever the 
United States exercised federal law enforcement power. Scholars have long 
recognized that those subject to unlawful searches, seizures, and other 
interferences with private rights could sue the officer or government agent 
in state court for common law trespass.328 The defendant official could 
attempt to justify the trespass by pointing to lawful authority. Without it, he 
would be liable for damages. These damages were understood to enforce 
constitutional norms. 
As we have seen above, those harmed by unlawful official conduct on 
the high seas and in foreign territory were likewise entitled to sue the 
officer in federal court for damages arising from maritime trespass.329 
Under the law of nations, seizures on the high seas were subject to the 
authority of the captor’s sovereign.330 The sovereign’s agent could seize a 
vessel only upon reasonable suspicion that the vessel was within that 
authority.331 Without reasonable suspicion, the capture was unlawful and 
the owner was entitled to restitution in the captor’s courts.332 Without 
probable cause for the capture, the captor could be held liable for 
damages.333 
The United States Constitution authorized Congress to define crimes 
on the high seas and make rules governing captures.334 Captains of U.S. 
warships seeking to enforce a criminal or civil municipal law on the high 
seas, therefore, could only seize vessels upon reasonable suspicion of a 
violation of that law. Courts enforced these laws, which arose under the 
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law of nations, by awarding damages to those whose ships were seized 
without lawful authority.335 The subject matter of the U.S. law the officer 
had been attempting to enforce apparently was irrelevant—courts evaluated 
the lawfulness of seizures made to enforce non-intercourse acts,336 
embargoes,337 criminal laws,338 and war.339 Complying with an executive 
order that exceeded congressional authorization was no defense—the 
authority had to come from Congress.340 
To my knowledge, Americans did not conceive of a maritime trespass 
suit against a U.S. officer as a mechanism to enforce the Bill of Rights in 
the way that Americans may have understood a common law trespass suit 
against a federal officer to enforce the Fourth Amendment.341 But the suits 
illustrate that federal courts enforced separation of powers limits on the 
Executive’s authority to enforce U.S. law against anyone, anywhere. As the 
Supreme Court later noted, due process entails “[t]he enforcement of these 
[constitutional] limitations by judicial process.”342 Functionally, suits 
against officers ensured due process of law for anyone threatened by 
unlawful deprivations, regardless of where the deprivation occurred. 
D.   Addressing Alternative Explanations 
Much of the foregoing historical evidence is indirect. It consists of 
practice, rather than affirmative assertions about what the Due Process 
Clause requires. Some of the evidence is ambiguous⎯Did Congress 
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decline to authorize the President to destroy pirates upon capture because it 
believed the Fifth Amendment prohibited such a deprivation of life or for 
some other reason? Here I consider several other possible explanations for 
the evidence. It is important to note, however, that these explanations are 
not mutually exclusive. Rather, many are mutually reinforcing. Sometimes 
diplomatic strategy coincides with constitutional obligation, and so on. 
The first possibility to consider is that Americans provided due 
process because they believed the law of nations required them to do so. 
For civil admiralty suits, that is almost certainly the case. Admiralty law 
and procedures were well-known and applied by admiralty courts in all the 
maritime powers.343 But each of those powers also had their own municipal 
constitutional structures that affected the relationship of those courts to the 
rest of the government, and they also had their own municipal laws 
governing conduct on the sea.344 While a prize respondent could expect 
courts in England, France, and the United States to use nearly identical 
procedures, the respondent could not expect the courts to take the same 
approach to the nation’s substantive law, because that law would be 
governed by domestic constitutional principles.345 In any case, at the highest 
level of abstraction, the law of nations and due process of law are probably 
best understood as reinforcing the required procedural protections in civil 
admiralty cases. 
Criminal admiralty cases were different. The law of nations may have 
held that pirates were entitled to a trial of some kind.346 But the law of 
nations said nothing about the nature of that trial.347 Every nation proceeded 
according to its own municipal law. The United States, alone, uniformly 
tried offenses on the high seas (and foreign waters) according to the same 
structural and procedural protections that applied to all other criminals.348 
As we have seen, Britain had a dual system.349 A long list of offenses on the 
high seas were tried in England by Admiralty Session according to the 
course of the common law. Throughout the eighteenth century, however, 
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England tried piracy, robbery, and felonies committed on the high seas 
before special commissions in the colonies according to the civil law.350 
Interestingly, in 1806, some fifteen years after the first criminal law 
statute in the United States expressly provided that pirates would be tried 
according to due process of law, Britain reversed course again. A Mr. 
Jervis introduced a bill in the House of Commons “for altering and 
expediting the trial of offences committed in distant parts on the high 
seas.”351 The dual system, he claimed, had two problems. The Act of 1699 
covered only a subset of the offenses covered by the Act of 1536; the 
commissions in the colonies could only try a handful of crimes on the high 
seas, many of which went unpunished because it was so difficult to 
transport the accused to Britain for trial.352 The second problem was that the 
commissions in the colonies “acted upon the principles of the civil law, 
which were very different from those of the common law of this 
country. . . . The design of [Jervis’s] bill, therefore, was to prevent the 
necessity for bringing home the offenders, and also that they might enjoy 
the benefit of the trial by jury, and not be tried according to the forms of the 
civil law.”353 Parliament enacted the bill in essentially the same form, 
extending “one uniform course of trial” for all offenses at sea to 
commissions sitting in the colonies.354 They would “adjudge according to 
the common course of the laws of this realm used for offences committed 
upon the land within this realm, and not otherwise.”355 
This 1806 bill underscores two points about the foregoing account of 
due process. First, the trial procedures for crimes committed on the high 
seas were a matter of municipal law, not the law of nations. For more than 
a century, Britain had two different procedural regimes. Neither were 
understood to be required by, or to offend, the law of nations. When Britain 
unified the regime, it did not do so because of the law of nations. Second, 
Britain itself came to acknowledge that its own constitutional tradition 
counseled trying offenses at sea by the common law. Well after the 
American Revolution, and after the United States had committed itself to 
trying all crimes by jury, Britain extended “the benefit of the trial by 
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jury”356 and the “common course of the laws of [the] realm” to all offenses 
at sea, wherever the trial would be held.357 
Britain was not alone in trying pirates in special courts. Throughout 
this period, French law provided for the trial of pirates in special admiralty 
courts, outside of the ordinary criminal courts.358 As we have seen, Spain 
sometimes tried pirates by court-martial.359 Nothing in the law of nations 
itself, or in the practice of other nations, suggests that a nation was 
obligated to try offenses at sea or outside of its sovereign territory in the 
same courts and according to the same procedures that it used to try other 
offenses. 
The second possibility is that the United States provided due process 
for the trial of conduct abroad for reasons of diplomacy. The foregoing 
evidence about other nations’ municipal law and practice regarding the trial 
of extraterritorial conduct undermines this argument. While every nation 
was expected to supply admiralty courts for the trial of prize cases and civil 
maritime suits,360 there is no evidence that the United States relied on 
ordinary federal courts to punish offenses at sea because of diplomatic 
pressure. And since other nations did things differently, they would have 
had no reason to push the United States to provide more rather than less 
procedural protections for pirates. 
Another possibility is that the Executive and Judicial Departments 
provided due process simply because Congress required it in the relevant 
statutes. Congress, according to this view, lawfully could have provided for 
a different procedural regime for offenses at sea had it wanted to do so. 
This seems unlikely, for several reasons. All of the officials who expressly 
considered the application of the Fifth Amendment to the punishment of 
crimes committed abroad concluded that the provision required conviction 
in a federal court.361 Moreover, Congress had the incentive and the 
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opportunity to abrogate due process of law for offenses at sea during the 
early 1820s when it equipped the Navy to suppress piracy in the West 
Indies.362 It declined to do so, concluding instead that it was “essentially 
due to the rights of all” to try pirates in ordinary federal courts according to 
the common law363—at the same time that Spanish colonial forces were 
trying and executing pirates by courts-martial. 
Finally, perhaps Congress was constrained by the separation of 
powers provisions of the Constitution, not by the Fifth Amendment. After 
all, Article III provides that the trial of all crimes shall be by jury.364 It vests 
the admiralty jurisdiction in the federal courts.365 In light of these 
provisions, perhaps the Due Process Clause was redundant. In some ways, 
this is true. The Due Process Clause forbade the government from 
depriving rights except according to law. The Constitution was the law. 
Had Congress enacted a law that purported to vest the power to adjudicate 
piracy in a non-Article III court, or to authorize a court to try piracy 
without a jury trial, the law would have been subject to the charge that it 
violated Article III.366 When the Executive, or the statutory tribunal, 
attempted to deprive a defendant of life, liberty, or property according to 
that law, the deprivation would have violated the Due Process Clause. 
What the Clause added was the right to enforce the law, including the 
Constitution, in federal court. This would have included not only suits for 
damages but also the right to make motions and raise objections to any 
unlawful procedure by which the government attempted to deprive a party 
of life, liberty, or property. The totality of the historical evidence strongly 
suggests that Americans believed that the Due Process Clause, along with 
the separation of powers, applied to governmental deprivations of rights—
anywhere, and against anyone. 
VI.  DUE PROCESS ABROAD TODAY 
This Part considers the implications of the foregoing history for the 
scope of due process abroad today. It briefly notes the challenges of doing 
so; argues that the history strongly supports extending due process to U.S. 
law enforcement against anyone, anywhere in the world; and discusses the 
specific implications of the history for suits arising from cross-border 
shootings, officially-sponsored kidnappings and detentions, governmental 
deprivations of statutory immigration benefits, and criminal procedure. 
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A.   Of Water and Bridges 
While most jurists and scholars agree that the early history matters for 
contemporary constitutional interpretation and application,367 everyone has 
their own view about which historical evidence is most salient, how much 
weight it should have, and when it should yield to subsequent 
developments in law, society, and political morality. Even self-proclaimed 
originalists have splintered like medieval scholastics into competing 
methodological schools.368 If “we are all originalists now,”369 then perhaps 
no one is. 
Moreover, translating the early history of constitutional 
extraterritoriality into contemporary doctrine presents unique challenges. 
The United States seems to have abandoned a strict adherence to due 
process abroad shortly after the period this Article explores. In 1828, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress had constitutional authority to create 
territorial courts that did not comply with the requirements of Article III.370 
During the nation’s rapid expansion in the nineteenth century, the federal 
government systematically declined to extend equal rights as a matter of 
constitutional law (as opposed to congressional policy) to Indians, 
immigrants, and residents of new territories.371 The Court maintained that 
the federal government possessed powers inherent in sovereignty—powers 
the Constitution neither expressly gave nor expressly limited.372 While these 
developments each have their own history and require their own legal 
analysis, it may not be too much to generalize that Americans, faced with 
the challenges and prospects of a far-flung and culturally pluralistic empire, 
to some extent embraced the reasoning of the imperial British constitution 
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that they had once repudiated. By doing so, they quietly abandoned an 
early commitment to due process abroad. 
In addition, much of the historical evidence on which this Article’s 
argument relies is of an unusual sort: inference from early practice. 
Although some expressly considered the issue and concluded that due 
process applies abroad, most Americans simply supplied it routinely, even 
when doing so undermined the government’s policy goals and even when 
competing nations did not. This form of evidence raises intriguing 
questions for originalists⎯How much should early practice bear on an 
analysis of the “original understanding” of the constitutional text? Should 
unarticulated but clearly consistent early practices bind contemporary 
constitutional decisionmakers? 
For my part, I am persuaded that early Americans understood that due 
process applied to law enforcement activities abroad, even when they did 
not articulate it as contemporary jurists would. The historical background, 
constitutional text, the testimony of some of the brightest legal lights of the 
founding generation, and the uniform early practice of U.S. officers all 
support this conclusion. Whether there is too much water under the bridge 
to return to the original understanding is another question, and, like all 
legal questions, a matter of judgment. 
B.   Contemporary Implications 
1.   General Principles 
The early history supports extending due process to the enforcement 
of U.S. law against anyone, anywhere. As a general matter, this means that 
the government may not in the course of enforcing U.S. law deprive 
anyone of “life, liberty, or property” without complying with applicable 
substantive, structural, and procedural law. It also means that the 
procedures by which the United States deprives someone of rights must 
meet a minimum constitutional threshold of notice and opportunity to 
respond. 
Although the United States usually provides the full panoply of due 
process protections in litigation based on foreign conduct, the Supreme 
Court has never squarely held that the Due Process Clause requires this. 
The last time the Court considered the issue, in Reid v. Covert, the Justices 
could not reach a majority opinion about whether the Clause applies 
universally, applies conditionally depending on functional concerns, or 
categorically does not apply to trials arising from conduct abroad.373 The 
majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush holds that the Suspension Clause 
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applies to the detention of enemy aliens at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.374 But it 
remains unclear whether the Court’s ad hoc and fact-dependent reasoning 
applies to the Due Process Clause or to detentions by U.S. officers on 
territory that the United States has not leased from another sovereign for an 
indefinite term.375 By contrast, the early enforcement of piracy and other 
crimes on the high seas suggests that Americans understood due process to 
keep pace with Congress’s power to define and punish crimes and civil 
wrongs abroad. 
Some may object that most of the evidence above pertains to law 
enforcement on the high seas, not on foreign soil. Several early statutes 
criminalized conduct in foreign territory,376 but I am unaware of any 
indictments based on such conduct. As discussed above, the doctrine of 
territorial sovereignty held that a nation could only extend its criminal 
legislation to another state’s territory with that state’s consent.377 Perhaps, 
then, the evidence above does no more than show that due process 
extended to the high seas; maybe citizens and aliens on foreign soil are 
different. The U.S. now extends its criminal statutes, by treaty, to a wide 
range of conduct committed on foreign territory.378 Perhaps, the argument 
might go, the federal government may avoid the limits of due process of 
law by acting on foreign territory pursuant to a statute enacted to comply 
with a treaty. This argument, however, has two flaws. 
First, treaties are almost certainly subject to constitutional limits. The 
Supreme Court has held that a treaty may authorize Congress to enact a 
statute that it would otherwise lack the constitutional power to enact,379 but 
it does not follow that the Constitution’s limitations, such as ex post facto 
and due process provisions, do not apply to statutes enacted to enforce a 
treaty.380 Whatever legislative power a treaty may add to Congress, it 
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derives from the government’s constitutional authority to make treaties and 
enact legislation. These laws are subject to the Constitution’s express 
limits. 
More basically, allowing Congress to skirt constitutional limits by 
treaty is inconsistent with the notion that the government derives its 
authority from the American people. Why would those people have 
authorized their government to avoid constitutional limits—but only when 
the government teams up with a foreign sovereign? As Justice Hugo Black 
noted, “[i]n effect, such construction [of the Constitution] would permit 
amendment of that document in a manner not sanctioned by Article V.”381 
2.   Translating Early Due Process Into Contemporary Due Process 
Before turning to the more specific applications of due process 
abroad, it will be helpful to distinguish among the varieties of 
contemporary due process doctrines. Courts rely on due process for 
jurisdictional limits—the authority of a sovereign to exercise power over a 
certain person. They likewise recognize limits on the procedures by which 
the government deprives someone of rights, usually called “procedural due 
process.” Finally, “substantive due process” holds that there are certain 
fundamental rights with which the government may not interfere no matter 
how much process it provides. Of these three categories, the historical 
understanding of due process explored in this Article most closely 
resembles today’s “procedural due process.” The original understanding, 
however, is different from the balancing test of contemporary procedural 
due process. The original understanding of due process guaranteed that 
courts would enforce constitutional and statutory limits on governmental 
deprivations of “life, liberty, or property.” 
There are currently a number of unanswered questions about the 
application of due process to the nation’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.382 The 
 
responsible for the Bill of Rights—let alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition—to 
construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an international agreement 
without observing constitutional prohibitions.”); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). 
 381 Reid, 354 U.S. at 17. 
 382 See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due 
Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1223 (1992) (explaining that the Supreme Court has not addressed 
whether the Fifth Amendment limits extraterritorial application of substantive federal law); Anthony J. 
Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1310–11 (2014) 
(distinguishing between prescriptive jurisdiction (power to prohibit) and adjudicative jurisdiction 
(power to adjudicate)); Michael Farbiarz, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
507, 531–45 (2016) (arguing that the only fairness limit on U.S. extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
should be whether the nation in which the defendant committed the conduct would punish it to the same 
degrees as U.S. law); Brian M. Kelly, Due Process, Choice of Law, and the Prosecution of Foreign 
Nationals for Providing Material Support to Terrorist Organizations in Conflicts Abroad (Harvard Law 
School Addison Brown Student Writing Prize, May 2015), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
442 
evidence presented in this article does not directly address these issues. For 
the most part, it appears that early congresses conscientiously crafted 
extraterritorial statutes to regulate only the conduct of U.S. citizens, 
conduct that otherwise directly affected the interest of U.S. citizens, or 
conduct that could plausibly be understood to amount to a violation of a 
universal norm under the law of nations. Whether Congress placed these 
tacit limits on extraterritorial criminal statutes out of a concern for the law 
of nations, the Constitution, international comity, or a combination of them 
is beyond this Article’s scope.383 Although the early Supreme Court held 
that Congress must clearly state its intent to depart from the law of 
nations,384 I am aware of no cases in which the Court declined to enforce a 
federal law because Congress lacked the power to reach the particular 
extraterritorial conduct. Nor am I aware of a case in which the Court 
declined to exercise adjudicative jurisdiction on the ground that the 
defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the United States. 
The evidence above likewise does not support the notion that early 
courts enforced what jurists call “substantive due process.” There is simply 
no evidence from early U.S. extraterritorial law enforcement that the 
founding generation believed the federal government’s authority to make 
general and prospective laws was limited by fundamental rights, whether 
sounding in the right to contract385 or the right of physical privacy.386 
The evidence does, however, support the application of something 
more akin to contemporary procedural due process to the government’s law 
enforcement abroad. The government was obligated to comply with the 
separation of powers, the Executive was obligated to comply with 
congressional authority, and the courts were obligated to comply with 
appropriate procedures before a suspect or defendant could be deprived of 
rights. This understanding was reflected in the laws themselves, the 
instructions and conduct of executive officers, and judicial enforcement. 
3.   Applying Due Process Abroad 
This section discusses the implications of this broad principle for 
specific cases. At the outset, it must be noted that constitutional law 
distinguishes between rights and remedies. Although the Supreme Court 
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long ago observed that a right implies a remedy,387 the Court has exercised 
great discretion over when and under what circumstances a judicial remedy 
will be available for an acknowledged constitutional violation.388 For 
instance, during much of the nineteenth century, a party could sue an 
officer for an unreasonable and unwarranted search and seizure;389 by 
contrast, the primary remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation today is 
exclusion of evidence procured by the violation.390 Each implication of the 
historical evidence for a given case must therefore be attuned to this 
distinction between the scope of a due process right and the appropriate 
remedy for a violation of that right. The following Sections will therefore 
discuss both rights and remedies. 
a.   Cross-border shootings 
The historical evidence supports applying the Due Process Clause to 
cross-border shootings. In Hernández v. Mesa, a Border Patrol agent in 
Texas shot and killed a Mexican teenager on the other side of the border.391 
The victim’s parents sued the officer for violating the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to the shooting because the victim lacked 
sufficient contacts with the United States.392 The judges could not agree 
about whether the Due Process Clause applied to the shooting, but they 
unanimously concluded that, even if it did apply, the officer was entitled to 
qualified immunity because there was no prior case law on point.393 
Earlier this year, the Supreme Court remanded the case with 
instructions to consider whether the plaintiffs had a cause of action for 
damages against the officer consistent with the Court’s doctrine about 
when such actions are available.394 With respect to the plaintiffs’ due 
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process claim, the Court tweaked the lower court’s analysis. The lower 
court had based its decision that the officer was entitled to qualified 
immunity on the due process claim in part because the victim was an alien 
and had few contacts with the United States.395 But the officer did not know 
those facts when he pulled the trigger.396 So they should not count, the 
Supreme Court said, when determining whether the officer could have 
reasonably known whether his conduct was unlawful.397 This direction, 
though it could expose the officer to suit in this case, implies that the 
Supreme Court believes that the victim’s nationality and location are 
salient for at least some due process claims (when the officer knows the 
victim is an alien, or is outside the United States, or both). This is 
unfortunate. The historical evidence discussed in this article strongly 
supports the application of the Due Process Clause to a law enforcement 
official’s extraterritorial “depriv[ation]” of an alien’s “life” “without due 
process of law.” 
One difficulty of analyzing the constitutionality of a cross-border 
shooting is that courts ordinarily analyze officer shootings under the Fourth 
Amendment “excessive force” doctrine.398 Indeed, the Government argued 
that the plaintiffs’ claims in Hernández were “cognizable only under the 
Fourth Amendment and not under the Fifth Amendment.”399 Analyzing 
extraterritorial claims under the Fourth Amendment presents difficulties 
that do not arise under the Fifth Amendment. The first is that the Supreme 
Court has clearly held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
extraterritorial searches and seizures of alien property, at least for purposes 
of the exclusionary rule.400 The second is that the Fourth Amendment 
speaks of the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects.”401 While the “right of the people” may or may not have 
been historically understood to refer only to the rights of U.S. citizens or 
nationals, the Fourth Amendment suggests that possibility in a way that the 
Fifth Amendment does not. Still, courts considering whether to apply the 
Fourth Amendment to cross-border shootings could distinguish Verdugo-
Urquidez on the facts: a cross-border shooting does not raise any of the 
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practical difficulties raised when U.S. officers engage in an investigation 
abroad.402 Justice Anthony Kennedy, in particular, has been drawn to a 
functional approach to constitutional extraterritoriality.403 
By contrast to the Fourth Amendment, analysis of cross-border 
shootings under the Due Process Clause would be clear, without territorial 
and citizenship exceptions. The text of the clause apparently extends to all 
U.S. deprivations of rights regardless of place or person. Moreover, the 
history presented above corroborates this reading.404 
Even were a court to hold that the Due Process Clause applies to a 
cross-border shooting, it might nevertheless conclude that special factors 
about such a shooting “counsel hesitation” about allowing a cause of action 
against the federal officer.405 In particular, a court could conclude that 
permitting a damages suit for extraterritorial conduct could raise diplomatic 
and foreign affairs issues best left to the political branches.406 
The foregoing history does not support that conclusion. During the 
early years of the Republic, Americans enforced constitutional rights with 
common law suits against government agents.407 As this Article has shown, 
citizens and aliens alike routinely sued federal officers and agents for 
violating their rights on the high seas.408 Furthermore, there is strong 
 
 402 See Hernández, 137 S. Ct. at 2007 (“The Fourth Amendment question in this case, however, is 
sensitive and may have consequences that are far reaching. It would be imprudent for this Court to 
resolve that issue when, in light of the intervening guidance provided in Abasi, doing so may be 
unnecessary to resolve this particular case.”). 
 403 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008). 
 404 Applying the Due Process Clause to a deliberate killing does not require an account of 
“substantive due process.” The Court has sometimes suggested that governmental deprivations of life 
raise a question of substantive due process. See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). 
As I have argued elsewhere, the label substantive due process misdescribes the Court’s analysis in those 
cases—the constitutional question is whether the government had lawful authority to deprive the person 
of life, i.e., whether another law justified the killing. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 
1788–90. 
 405 See James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275, 297 (Judith Resnik & Vicki C. Jackson eds., 
2009). See generally Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (articulating the hesitation doctrine). 
 406 Even if the Court holds that parties may sue an officer for a cross-border shooting, it will 
probably hold that the defendant in Hernández is entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that the 
extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment was not well established when the shooting 
occurred. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). 
 407 See James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional 
Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 123 n.28 (2009) (“Although no brief summary can capture the 
complexity of the accountability rules in the nineteenth century, individuals could bring a variety of 
actions (injunction, mandamus, trespass, assumpsit, ejectment) to test the legality of government 
action.”); Woolhandler, supra note 328, at 100. 
 408 See supra Section V.C. 
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historical support for the notion that Americans understood that due 
process required courts to enforce constitutional and statutory limits on 
governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property.409 At a minimum, the 
early cases provide powerful evidence that the federal courts did not 
categorically exclude a suit against a federal officer on the ground that it 
arose from extraterritorial conduct against aliens. 
b.   Officially sponsored extraterritorial kidnapping and detention 
The foregoing analysis applies with equal force to officially sponsored 
deprivations of liberty in the form of unlawful captures and detentions. The 
historical evidence discussed in this article suggests that captures and 
detentions attributable to a U.S. law enforcement officer acting under color 
of law are subject to due process of law—that is, officers must act 
according to authority conferred by law and suspects are entitled to the 
Constitution’s separation of powers and procedural protections. The 
location of the capture or detention and the political loyalty of the 
defendant are immaterial.410 Yet the Supreme Court has held that a court is 
not obligated to dismiss a prosecution on the ground that the defendant was 
brought into the court’s jurisdiction unlawfully.411 U.S. courts thus apply 
the principle of male captus, bene detentus, which ensures that a defendant 
will not escape punishment because of an officer’s wrongdoing.412 
Two questions about deprivations of physical liberty abroad remain. 
First, what is the appropriate remedy for a violation? It need not be 
dismissal of the case. In the early Republic, courts awarded damages 
against officers who, by exceeding their authority, committed trespass on 
the high seas. The legislature routinely indemnified officers who had been 
found liable.413 The Court could simply revive this practice today, perhaps 
under the Alien Tort Act. Thus courts would provide a remedy for 
 
 409 See supra Section III.C. 
 410 See supra Section V.C. 
 411 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (unlawful rendition from Mexico); 
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (interstate abduction); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) 
(defendant abducted from Peru); see United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding 
that defendant was entitled to hearing on whether the United States engineered his kidnapping in 
Uruguay). “Whether the inherent power of a court to sanction the prosecution for outrageous conduct 
might extend to government behavior in capture and rendition has not been tested.” RESTATEMENT 
(FOURTH) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 311 Reporter’s Note 5 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 
2017). 
 412 See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 311 Reporter’s Note 7. 
 413 See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 403, 123 n.28. 
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extraterritorial conduct that violated the Due Process Clause without 
abandoning the principle of male captus, bene detentus.414 
The second question has to do with the application of the Constitution 
to the conduct of a foreign sovereign or private party. Should the 
Constitution prohibit the government from relying on the conduct of 
another party that, if performed by a U.S. agent, would violate the Due 
Process Clause? For instance, suppose Iraqi police capture and torture a 
suspect and then send him, along with evidence gathered as a result of the 
torture, to the United States for prosecution. 
The history explored above does not speak directly to this point, but it 
does offer some hints. Americans did engage in joint law enforcement 
activities with other sovereigns, notably working with Spain and Britain to 
capture pirates in Cuba and Puerto Rico. While American officers did not 
personally violate the suspect’s due process rights, they apparently had no 
qualms with capturing suspects in Cuba and handing them over to Spanish 
authorities for trial and punishment by courts-martial.415 This might suggest 
that Americans hewed to a strict understanding of sovereign responsibility 
or what, in the context of U.S. constitutional doctrine, would be known as 
“state action.”416 U.S. law governed American officers but did not apply to 
other nations. U.S. officers bore no legal responsibility for another 
sovereign’s independent decisions. The evidence above does not resolve 
whether this logic would have applied when the United States sought to 
prosecute someone whose presence had been procured by an independent 
sovereign (or private party) by means that would violate due process. 
c.   Deprivation of immigration benefits 
The principle of due process abroad applies as well to immigration 
and other governmental entitlements. President Trump’s recent Executive 
Orders instituting bans on travel to the United States by certain 
nonimmigrants are to some extent in tension with this principle. The first 
Order, for instance, purported to suspend the right of certain immigrants 
(those with green cards) and nonimmigrants (those with temporary visas) 
who had traveled abroad, or who wished to travel abroad, to reenter the 
 
 414 See Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522 (“There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to 
permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his 
will.”). 
 415 See supra Section V.B.1. 
 416 See generally Nathan S. Chapman, The Establishment Clause, State Action, and Town of 
Greece, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 405, 408–11 (2015) (explaining the distinction between state and 
private action in the Establishment Clause doctrine). 
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United States.417 The restriction appeared to apply whether the alien was 
abroad or within the United States when the President issued the Order.418 
The Supreme Court has held that a “returning resident alien is entitled 
as a matter of due process to a hearing on the charges underlying any 
attempt to exclude him.”419 The cases in which the Court has applied this 
doctrine all arise from a permanent resident’s attempt to reenter the United 
States after traveling abroad.420 While Congress has vast discretion to 
determine the procedures to which immigrants are entitled,421 the Court has 
made it clear that due process of law requires the government to comply 
with those statutory procedures on a case-by-case basis.422 Furthermore, the 
Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires some minimum 
procedural protections, although it has not clarified what those protections 
are.423 The underlying right is a statutory right of reentry. Therefore, it is 
probably best understood as a form of “new property”424 subject to 
deprivation according to the “procedural due process” test articulated in 
Mathews v. Eldridge.425 Under this test, courts weigh the claimant’s right—
in this case the right of reentry—against the government’s interest in 
depriving the claimant of the right and the relative cost of procedures that 
would afford a more accurate adjudication.426 
The foregoing history provides very little evidence that is directly on 
point. The founding generation did not consider statutory rights to be a 
form of “property” that the legislature could not change for an entire class 
without an adjudication.427 They did, however, understand that the 
government could not deprive persons of rights abroad without due 
process. Translating the due process regime of the Founding Era into our 
 
 417 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, § 3(c) (Jan. 27, 2017). 
 418 See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) (“It was reported that thousands 
of visas were immediately canceled, hundreds of travelers with such visas were prevented from 
boarding airplanes bound for the United States or denied entry on arrival, and some travelers were 
detained.”). 
 419 Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 460 (1963); see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33–
34 (1982); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601–03 (1953). But see Shaughnessy v. United 
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213–15 (1953) (holding that an alien who had left the United States 
to spend nearly twenty months “behind the Iron Curtain” was not entitled to a hearing before exclusion 
from the country). 
 420 See Landon, 459 U.S. at 33; Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 460; Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 591–92. 
 421 See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214–16. 
 422 See Landon, 459 U.S. at 33–34. 
 423 See id. at 34–35 (“The constitutional sufficiency of procedures in any situation, of course, varies 
with the circumstances.”). 
 424 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970). 
 425 424 U.S. 319, 332–33 (1976). 
 426 Id. at 335. 
 427 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 19, at 1781–82. 
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own, therefore, suggests that permanent residents would be entitled to some 
minimum procedural protections before being deprived of the statutory 
right to return to the United States. Understood this way, the history does 
support the current doctrine, although because it requires a translation of 
the historical understanding of property, it may go too far to conclude that 
the government is required to provide a trial in federal court for each 
permanent resident before it may deprive the resident of the right to return. 
In such cases, Mathews may strike the right balance.428 
d.   Criminal procedure 
The principle that due process protects those abroad from unlawful 
governmental deprivations likewise has implications for procedures in 
criminal prosecutions in U.S. courts. Most obviously, it suggests that 
criminal defendants are entitled to equal procedural safeguards regardless 
of whether they are prosecuted for conduct abroad and regardless of their 
nationality. 
Difficulties can arise when the allegedly criminal conduct occurred 
abroad. For instance, Michael Farbiarz has noted that although the 
government has wide authority pursuant to treaties to discover evidence 
abroad, some defendants may be unable to rely on a subpoena to obtain 
evidence abroad.429 This gives the government an advantage in discovery 
that it does not have in prosecutions that do not rely on extraterritorial 
evidence. The government did not have this advantage in the first years of 
the Republic. Originally, the government and defendant were equally 
disadvantaged by a dearth of evidence and witnesses in cases arising on the 
high seas or within foreign territory. Evidence and witnesses for the 
government and defendant alike were ordinarily restricted to the ship, 
cargo, papers, and crews involved in the capture. The U.S. Navy was not an 
investigative outfit. 
To solve the modern mismatch, Farbiarz proposes that courts issue a 
Rule 17 order that prosecutors would be obligated to enforce. Rule 17 
authorizes a court to issue a subpoena requiring a witness to appear and 
testify, to produce evidence, or to attend a deposition.430 Under Farbiarz’s 
proposal, a subpoena issued on behalf of a defendant requiring the 
testimony or production of evidence of a witness outside the United States 
 
 428 This Article takes no view on whether nonimmigrant rights to enter or reenter the United States 
should be understood as “property” under the Due Process Clause. The Court has usually evaluated 
whether a public right amounts to “property” by reference to the specific entitlement statute, 
regulations, and social context. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 & n.8. That analysis is beyond this 
Article’s scope. 
 429 Farbiarz, supra note 382, at 628. 
 430 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a), (c)(1), (f). 
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would obligate the prosecutor to work with treaty partners to procure that 
testimony or evidence.431 Unfortunately, Farbiarz does not explain how the 
court would ensure compliance with such a subpoena. At one point he 
suggests that “dismissal of the case” might be an appropriate remedy for 
failure to comply, at least in some cases,432 but later states that “as a 
practical matter,” “the prosecutor would” “enforce” the court’s Rule 17 
decision.433 Elsewhere he asserts that “structural concerns should have no 
role to play in shaping such a due process doctrine.”434 
Relying on a prosecutor to enforce due process does not comply with 
the historical understanding of due process. Under that understanding, 
courts ensured that government agents did not deprive persons of rights 
except by law. If due process requires the government to provide a 
defendant with equal opportunity to gather evidence abroad, allowing the 
prosecutor to oversee that opportunity would not satisfy due process. 
Farbiarz’s proposal would more closely approximate historical due process 
if the court supervised and enforced the subpoena by threat of discipline 
against the government officers who failed to comply, whether through 
contempt, dismissal of the indictment, or some other form of discipline. 
This would preserve the court’s structural role as the institution responsible 
for safeguarding the defendant’s due process rights and incentivize the 
prosecutor’s compliance. 
4.   War 
Many of the most contentious questions of constitutional 
extraterritoriality arise from the nation’s prosecution of the “war on terror.” 
This Article has focused on the early history of the nation’s nonwar law 
enforcement abroad, but it does have some implications for an analysis of 
due process during war. The evidence suggests that, outside of war, at least, 
due process applied not only to those captured abroad and tried in the 
United States but also to the conduct of U.S. officers abroad.435 This alters 
the baseline question for the original understanding of due process during 
war. Location alone cannot resolve the application of the Bill of Rights to 
the exercise of war powers abroad.436 
The Constitution itself provides for departures from ordinary due 
process during war. The Suspension Clause and the Third Amendment 
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condition such departures upon war and require that the departures be 
according to law.437 Likewise, the Constitution gives Congress the authority 
to provide for different procedures for the military justice system,438 and 
Congress has done so from the beginning.439 These are entirely consistent 
with the notion of due process of law this Article has assumed—Congress 
may provide, by law, for departures from ordinary due process of law 
because the Constitution, a higher law, says so. 
The more interesting historical questions are whether, when, and how 
a state of war entitled Congress to depart from ordinary due process of law 
with respect to enemies at home and abroad. Likewise, could the President 
do so, in the course of repelling an attack or during a state of war, without 
congressional authority? These are issues I would like to explore more fully 
in future scholarship that builds on this Article’s historical groundwork. 
Outside of the context of a criminal investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment, the foregoing historical evidence has little to say about the 
proper application of due process to the government’s antiterrorism efforts. 
CONCLUSION 
The application of due process to the government’s conduct abroad is 
of immediate and vital importance. Cases involving cross-border shootings, 
the suspension of immigration benefits, and the investigative conduct of 
U.S. officers abroad fill the headlines, and cases raising similar issues will 
likely continue to proliferate. Unfortunately, the doctrine regarding the 
extraterritoriality of the Due Process Clause remains woefully 
underdeveloped, vague, and inconsistent. The Supreme Court seems intent 
on extending constitutional rights abroad on an ad hoc, functional basis that 
exacerbates uncertainty and maximizes judicial discretion. Scholars have 
justified this approach, at least with respect to the Due Process Clause, on 
the basis of original history. This Article upends that historical account. 
Based on the English background, the Constitution’s text and structure, and 
early federal practice, this Article argues that at its Founding, the federal 
government could not exercise its powers of law enforcement to deprive a 
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person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The location 
of the illegal conduct, the location of the capture, and the nationality of the 
defendant were immaterial. A corollary of this principle was that everyone 
could sue a U.S. officer in federal court for an unauthorized deprivation of 
rights abroad. This history has important implications for contemporary 
U.S. law enforcement abroad, the suspension of immigration benefits, and 
suits against U.S. officers. It also resets the baseline assumptions for 
considering the historical relationship between the separation of powers 
and individual rights during war. The question going forward is to what 
extent the war powers authorize the government to depart from the ordinary 
requirements of due process of law before depriving enemies, neutrals, and 
even citizens of life, liberty, or property. 
 
